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1997 / The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. asked, "What is the justi-
fication for depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence
of the lapse of time?"' A century later, we are still searching for a satisfactory answer
to that question. The purpose of this Article is to press that inquiry further.
The law of limitation of actions is the set of legislatively and judicially created
legal rules 2 -including the classification of claims, the duration of limitation periods,
the applicable principles of accrual and tolling, and the like-that determine whether
a claim is time-barred.3 With few exceptions,4 the policies on which limitation of
actions is based rarely have been the object of serious study.5 This lack of attention
is surprising. Statutes of limitation are an important feature of the legal landscape.
Virtually every country has them Their direct antecedents can be traced back for
centuries,7 and some sorts of time limits have been enforced for thousands of years
Today, they are ubiquitous; California alone has thousands of them?
The limitation system is the product of the interplay between two competing sets
of policies: those supporting the extinguishment of untimely claims and those en-
couraging the resolution of all claims, whether timely or untimely, on their sub-
1. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,476 (1897).
2. We use the term "rule" in the broad sense to include not just true rules, but also standards, guidelines,
and the like. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-
62 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959-68 (1995).
3. For convenience, we sometimes refer to this set of rules as the "limitation system." We prefer this term
to the term "statute of limitations" because statutes are only one source of the rules governing limitation of actions.
4. See Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. LJ. 130 (1955); see also 1
CALVIN W. CORMAN, LMITATON OF ACTONS § 1.1, at 11-17 (1991).
5. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1, at 86 (1985) (noting that "[llittle attention has been directed
toward the evaluation of the objectives of limitation provisions" in the criminal context); Holmes, supra note I, at
476 (describing statutes of limitation and prescription as "rules which, so far as I know, never have been explained
or theorized about in any adequate way").
6. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation... are found and approved
in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence:').
7. See 4 Hen. 7, ch. 24 (1487) (Eng.) (enacting the first English statute of limitation for real property
actions). Later versions grouped real property actions and personal actions into categories depending on the
character of the right sued upon. See The Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540) (Eng.); 21 Jam.
I, ch. 16 (1623) (Eng.). The 1623 statute provided the model upon which most American statutes of limitation are
based. See Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 ("[T]he English statute of limitations of the 21st of James I.... was adopted in
most of the American colonies before the Revolution, and has since been the foundation of nearly all of the like
legislation in this country.").
8. See, e.g., WiLLIA D. FERGUSON, THE STATurEOFLrMrrATIONS SAVINGS STATTrrES7 (1978) ("Statutes
of limitation relating to real property may be traced to ancient Greece orbeyond:); RuDOLFSOHM, THE INSTrrurEs
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 283 (Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1970) ("Emperors Honorious and
Theodosios... moved by obvious considerations of convenience, enacted in 424 A.D. that all actions should be
barred within a certain period.").
9. See generally Special Project: California Statutes of Limitation, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 744 (1995)
(collecting over 32,000 statutes imposing time limits affecting procedural and substantive rights, many of which
are true statutes of limitations or analogous thereto).
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stantive merits. A thorough understanding of both sets of policies is valuable for all
participants in the legal system. When uncertainty exists about which limitation rule
is applicable or when the applicable rule is unclear, advocates who want to make the
strongest possible argument ought to have both sets of policies in mind. So, too,
should judges who are called upon to apply, and in some instances to create, the rules
of the limitation system in deciding particular cases. Finally, legislators designing or
modifying a limitation system need to consider these policies to ensure that their
legislative choices are sensible ones. This Article describes the two sets of policies
and explores their implications."'
II. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL EXPRESSION
The statutes constituting the framework of California's limitation system were
initially enacted in 18501 and were codified in the Code of Civil Procedure in
1872.12 The limited legislative history 3 sheds little light on the legislature's views
regarding the purposes of limitation of actions in general.' 4 By contrast, the narrow
purposes of particular limitation statutes, especially those enacted during recent
decades, are more easily discerned.15 Given the absence of a clear statement of legis-
lative intent concerning statutes of limitation in general, and the important role courts
play in designing the rules of the limitation system, it is perhaps not surprising that
the judiciary has attempted to fill the gap.
10. For convenience, we will refer to allegedly injured parties or potential plaintiffs simply as "plaintiffs"
or "victims" and to alleged wrongdoers or potential defendants simply as "defendants" or "wrongdoers." Similarly,
we sometimes will use the term "punishment" when "imposition of civil liability" would technically be more
accurate.
11. See 1850 Cal. Stat. ch. 127, at 343-46. Although we have concentrated our attention on the law of
California, this should not limit the generality of our analysis. While there are some differences, the basic nature
and features of the law of limitation of actions vary little from state to state. Moreover, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have influenced the summaries of the policies of limitation of actions throughout the nation,
and we have incorporated these decisions into our analysis.
12. See generally William Wirt Blume, Adoption in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A
Chapter in American Legal History, 17 HAsTTNGs LJ. 701 (1966).
13. The original California statute of limitations was based on the Field Code. See Bollinger v. National Fire
Ins. Co.. 25 Cal. 2d 399, 408, 154 P.2d 399, 404 (1944). The Field Code derived its approach to the subject of
limitation of actions from the English Limitation Act of 1623. See Mary E. Miller, Barbed Wire in the Borderland:
Statute of Limitation Choices for Wrongful Discharge Claims, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 833, 835 n.7 (1986) ("The
amended New York Code of 1849 (Field Code) substituted code definitions for the common law forms of action
specified in the former statute of limitations and derived from the Limitations Act [of 1623].").
14. See Miller, supra note 13, at 835 ("Regarding both English law and the early American statutes, the
intent of the enacting legislatures is not readily apparent."). Indeed, one scholar has suggested that attempts to
discern the purpose of the English Limitations Act of 1623, from which most modem American limitation systems
are derived, are futile. Patrick J. Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era of Compensation Systems: Workmen's
Compensation Limitations Provisions forAccidental Injury Claims, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 541,547 n.23.
15. See, e.g., Michael F. Boyle & Leslie M. Hastings, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 3371
and 33Z.15: Defective Construction Defect Statutes, 21 PAc. LJ. 235, 243-49 (1990).
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Courts have summarized the policies favoring limitation of actions in a variety
of ways. One of the earliest judicial summaries to gain popularity in California was
the following:
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society, and are favored in
the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened juris-
prudence. They promote repose, by giving security and stability to human
affairs; important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate...
activity and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the
evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders
proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a
conclusive bar.16
Later, a standard summary was:
The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, enacted as a matter of public
policy to fix a limit within which an action must be brought, or the
obligation is presumed to have been paid, and is intended to run against
those who are neglectful of their rights, and who fail to use reasonable and
proper diligence in the enforcement thereof.... These statutes are declared
to be 'among the most beneficial to be found in our books.' 'They rest upon
sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare of society;' . . . The
underlying purpose of statutes of limitation is to prevent the unexpected
enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been
thrown off their guard by want of prosecution. 7
Another frequently-quoted summary, which has proved influential, is:
Statutes of limitation.., are designed to promote justice by preventing sur-
prises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have dis-
appeared. The theory is that even if one has ajust claim it is unjust not to put
the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the
16. Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. 402,406, 38 P. 51, 52-53 (1894) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, I01 U.S.
135, 139 (1879)); accord Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, 157 Cal. 192, 197, 106 P. 715, 717 (1910); Nichols
v. Randall, 136 Cal. 426,432,69 P. 26,28 (1902).
17. Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226,228-29, 153 P.2d 325,326 (1944) (quoting I HORACEG.
WoOD, A TREATISE O N THE LMrrATON OF ACnONS 8-9 (4th ed. 1916)); accord Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
30 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 180 P.2d 900, 903 (1947).
456
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right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them.
t8
More recently, the California Supreme Court summarized the purposes of limitation
of actions as follows:
The fundamental purpose of the statute [of limitations] is to give defendants
reasonable repose, that is, to protect parties from defending stale claims. A
second policy underlying the statute is to require plaintiffs to diligently
pursue their claims.' 9
At least four aspects of these judicial summaries of the policies promoted by
limitation of actions are noteworthy. First, although there is some agreement about
what the purposes of the limitation system are, there is considerable variation in the
policies courts mention or emphasize. This variance has two dimensions: substantive
and temporal.
The policies selected by a court for emphasis in an opinion are influenced, in
part, by the result the court intends to reach and by the facts which support that
result.20 For example, cases that favor plaintiffs often stress the purpose of statutes
of limitation is to encourage the claimant to act diligently and to refrain from inten-
tionally delaying the filing of suit after notice of a claim has been received, and find
the delay in filing was not the result of the plaintiffs conduct.21 Similarly, cases that
favor defendants commonly emphasize the value of repose and the importance of
minimizing the deterioration of evidence.?
18. Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353,362,572 P.2d 755,760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696,701 (1977) (quoting
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944)); accord Lackner v.
LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747,751,602 P.2d 393, 395, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979).
19. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1112,751 P.2d 923,928,245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662-63 (1988)
(citing Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502,512,535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,712 (1975)).
20. See LAWRENCEM. SOLAN,THELANGUAGE OF JUDGES 2-3 (1993) (noting that judicial opinions are, in
part, attempts to legitimize a result and to persuade others of its appropriateness, rather than merely to explain the
basis for the decision reached).
21. See, e.g., Pashley, 25 Cal. 2d at 228-29, 153 P.2d at 326 (noting that statutes of limitation are "intended
to run against those who are neglectful of their rights, and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the
enforcement thereof"). Of course, if the court believes the plaintiff has not been diligent, it may cite this purpose
as a reason for denying relief. See, e.g., Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1112, 751 P.2d at 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 663 ("A second
policy underlying the statute is to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims... and those failing to act with
reasonable dispatch will be barred.").
22. See, e.g., Wood, 20 Cal. 3d at 362,572 P.2d at 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (declining to apply the doctrine
of equitable tolling because "the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them"). A court, however, may also cite this purpose if it believes the defendant is not entitled to repose because
of his or her conduct. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 787, 598 P.2d 45, 53, 157 Cal. Rptr.
392, 400 (1979) (recognizing that "[s]tatutes of limitation have, as their general purpose, to provide repose and to
protect persons against the burden of having to defend against stale claims," but concluding that the defendants
were not entitled to repose because their conduct was continuing).
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The summaries of policies contained in judicial opinions also have varied over
time. In general, as the rules regarding limitation of actions have shifted to reflect a
preference for discovery-based accrual rather than event-based accrual, 2 the sum-
maries of the purposes of limitation of actions favored by the courts have undergone
a parallel migration. The judicial policy summaries currently in vogue place
relatively greater emphasis on the plaintiff's knowledge of the claim and the lack of
intentional delay, and relatively less emphasis on the value of repose and other
adverse consequences of deferred filing.24 This shift has resulted from an increasing
concern with what the California Supreme Court has called "the practical needs of
prospective plaintiffs."5
A second characteristic of judicial summaries of policies supporting limitation
of actions is that they are underinclusive. There are many more policies promoted by
a limitation system than are routinely acknowledged by the courts. In particular, at
the present time, there may be a judicial tendency to underestimate the number and
importance of the policies promoted by limitation of actions. This means, among
other things, that there is no comprehensive judicial summary of the policies pro-
moted by limitation of actions that may be consulted to assist the courts in resolving
difficult cases.
A third feature of judicial summaries of limitation of action policies is that they
use vague and overlapping terms. For example, courts frequently say that one of the
policies is to avoid the litigation of "stale" claims.2 6 In this context, "stale" could
mean any of the following: (a) evidence relevant to deciding the claim has
deteriorated; (b) prevailing legal and cultural standards have changed since the
underlying events occurred; (c) the defendant has altered his or her position and
would be prejudiced by assertion of the claim; or (d) a very long period of time has
elapsed between the underlying events and the filing of suit. Concepts such as
"staleness" need to be dissected if they are to be fully understood, and if the relative
force of the policies supporting and opposing limitation of actions is to be assessed
accurately.
23. See generally Stephen V. O'Neal, Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery
Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 106 (1980). Event-based accrual measures the limitation period from
the occurrence of a specific event (either the allegedly wrongful conduct or the resulting injury), regardless of the
plaintiff's knowledge, whereas discovery-based accrual measures the limitation period from the time the plaintiff
reasonably could have discovered the injury and its cause. See generally CORMAN, supra note 4, § 6. 1, at 370; Jolly,
44 Cal. 3d at 1109, 751 P.2d at 926, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
24. See Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1112, 751 P.2d at 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63 (acknowledging that "the funda-
mental purpose of the statute is to give defendants reasonable repose," but immediately adding that "[a] second
policy underlying the statute is to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims"); see also Kaiser Found. Hosp.
v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 39 Cal. 3d 57, 62,702 P.2d 197, 200,216 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1985) ("The
purpose of any limitation statute is to require 'diligent prosecution of known claims ....') (emphasis added).
25. Davies, 14 Cal. 3d at 512,535 P.2d at 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
26. See, e.g., Wyatt, 24 Cal. 3d at 787,598 P.2d at 53, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 400; Pashley, 25 Cal. 2d at 228-29,
153 P.2d at 326.
458
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. Finally, judicial summaries of the purposes of limitation of actions are not
explicitly based upon any substantive analysis of what role, if any, limitation of
actions does or should play in the legal system. This is hardly surprising because
courts are ill-suited for such a task. Courts are masters of the microscope, not the
telescope or the wide-angle lens. They focus, in-depth, on one case at a time. The
nature of adjudication causes them to give greater emphasis to short-term effects than
to long-term consequences, and institutional constraints make it difficult for courts
to transcend the limits on their perspective.27 In addition, the role played by the courts
in designing the limitation system is, at least as a matter of theory, less important
than and subordinate to the role played by the legislature. s As a consequence, how-
ever, courts decide close cases and establish some of the rules comprising the
limitation system without the benefit of an adequate theoretical basis for doing so.
This might not be a serious failing if the legislature thoroughly reassessed the role
of the limitation system on a periodic basis. There is no indication, however, that it
does.29 Instead, legislative modification of the limitation system in California has
largely been limited to occasional and highly selective tinkering, while the basic
structure and content of the principal statutes of limitation have remained remarkably
stable.30
Because of these characteristics of judicial summaries, it is worthwhile to
develop a more comprehensive and balanced description of the policies favoring and
disfavoring limitation of actions. Such a description should inform critical thinking
about each aspect of the limitation system.
27. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-56 (1977).
28. See Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consol.. Inc., 33 Cal. 3d 604,615,659 P.2d 1160, 1167, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 878 (1983) ("Statutes of limitation are products of legislative authority and control."). Whether this
theory reflects actual practice, however, is questionable. Upon closer examination, the supposedly interstitial role
of the courts in developing the rules of the limitation system turns out to be more substantial than classical theory
regarding the relative roles of the judicial and legislative branches suggests. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 192, 491 P.2d 421, 431, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 847 (1971) (asserting that
"I]egislative silence... may indicate that the Legislature has chosen to defer to judicial experience" in formulating
rules of accrual); Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399, 410, 154 P.2d 399, 405 (1944) ("In any event
this court is not powerless to formulate rules of procedure where justice demands it.").
29. See Developments in the Law.i: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter
Developments] ("So firmly have statutes of limitations become imbedded in our law in the course of centuries that
legislatures seldom reconsider them in the light of the various functions that they actually perform... ").
30. See Miller, supra note 13, at 837 ("The California scheme remains largely unchanged from that enacted
by the first state legislature in 1850 .... "). As the California Legislature recently acknowledged with respect to
the subject of criminal statutes of limitation:
It is the finding of the Legislature that since its enactment in 1872, California's basic three-year statute
of limitations for felonies has been subjected to piecemeal amendment, with no comprehensive
examination of the underlying rationale for the period of limitations, nor its continued suitability as
applied to specific crimes or categories of crimes.
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 909, sec. 3, at 3443 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 800).
1997/The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation
IMl. POLICIES FAVORING LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. Promote Repose
It is often said that the principal purpose of limiting the time within which
actions may be filed is to promote repose. It is seldom explained, however, what
the term "repose" means. In the context of limitation of actions, "repose" includes
at least four distinct but overlapping concepts: (a) to allow peace of mind; (b) to
avoid disrupting settled expectations; (c) to reduce uncertainty about the future; and
(d) to reduce the cost of measures designed to guard against the risk of untimely
claims. These four aspects are so tightly intertwined that courts have seldom
attempted to separate them. Since some of the aspects of repose are more problematic
than others, however, it makes sense to consider them separately.
1. Allow Peace of Mind
One aspect of repose is peace of mind.32 The concept is that at some point the
slate should be wiped clean, and wrongdoers-or those who are merely uncertain
about whether they have committed a wrong-should be relieved of the fear that they
will be called to account for past misconduct after some definite period of time has
elapsed. The rationale is that it is unfair to subject an individual to the threat of being
sued indefinitely.33
The theme of promoting peace of mind through limitation of actions can be
traced back hundreds of years, and has its roots in the concept of amnesty.34t draws
31. See, e.g., Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 7 Cal. 4th 926,935,873 P.2d 613, 618,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
440, 445 (1994) ("TIhe primary interest served by statutes of limitations is that of repose."); Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111,751 P.2d 923, 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662-63 (1988) ("[T]he fundamental purpose
of the statute [of limitations] is to give defendants reasonable repose, that is, to protect parties from defending stale
claims."); Wyatt, 24 Cal. 3d at 787, 598 P.2d at 53, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 400 ("[S]tatutes of limitation have, as their
general purpose, to provide repose and to protect persons against the burden of having to defend against stale claims
32. See 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 653 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "repose" as, inter alia, "relief or
respite from ... trouble or excitement," "[a] state of quiet or peaceful inaction or of freedom from disturbing
influences," and "peace of mind"); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (1986)
(defining ,repose' as "freedom from something that disturbs or excites: calm, peace, tranquility").
33. See David A. v. Superior Court (Jane D.), 20 Cal. App. 4th 281,285,24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537,540 (1993)
("[A] statute of limitations grants prospective defendants relief from the burden of indefinite exposure to stale
claims.").
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "amnesty" as "[a] sovereign act of
forgiveness for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain classes of persons) who have been
guilty of crime or delict"). Some early statutes of limitation concerning real property claims prohibited suit on
claims arising before a fixed date, usually 20 or 30 years earlier. Often the cutoff date was linked to an important
historical event heralding the beginning of a new era, such as the transfer of power from one monarch to another.
See, e.g., 3 Edw. 1, ch. 39 (1329) (Eng.). See generally HENRY THOMAS BANNING, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE
STATUTE LAW OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 2 (London, Steven & Haynes 2d ed. 1892); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OFENGLISH LAW 81 (Cambridge, Mass. The University Press 2d ed.
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support from important themes in Western culture,35 and from Christianity in
particular,36 such as forgiveness and faith in the ability of people to reform. It is
believed that such an approach encourages reform by wrongdoers, and enables those
who have changed their ways for the better to remain secure in the knowledge the
new lives they have worked hard to create will not be forfeited on account of past
37transgressions.
The value of peace of mind to the potential defendant depends upon several
factors, including his or her: (a) awareness of the existence of a possible claim; (b)
assessment of the merits of the claim; (c) perception of the likelihood that the claim
will be filed; (d) prediction of the magnitude of an adverse outcome; (e) tolerance for
risk; and (f) susceptibility to feelings of remorse. A person who is unaware that he
or she has committed a potential wrong will neither worry about being sued nor
worry about losing if he or she is sued. Similarly, a person who is aware that a
potential claim exists, but who is confident that he or she is innocent and will easily
defeat the claim, has only the burden of potential litigation to fear, rather than the
possibility of an adverse judgment. Thus, the benefits of peace of mind are perhaps
most valuable for the person who is highly risk-averse, who believes himself or
herself to be guilty, or who is unsure of his or her guilt.
In assessing the validity and weight of this purpose, therefore, it is necessary to
ask how much value should be placed on the desire of wrongdoers, or of persons
who are uncertain whether they are wrongdoers, for freedom from worry about being
called to account for past misdeeds. Currently, society appears to place relatively
little value on such considerations. For some, allowing peace of mind for the guilty,
or possibly guilty, is simply to indulge their social irresponsibility.38 On this view,
1898).
35. For example, see VicrOR HuGo, LES MISERABLES (1862), in which the protagonist, Jean Valjean, is
imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread. Vaijean escapes from prison and attempts to steal two silver candlesticks
from a bishop, who forgives him. Transformed by the bishop's kindness, VaIjean becomes an honest and respected
citizen, but he cannot achieve peace of mind because of the continuous pursuit of the relentless Inspector Javert.
Id.
The anxiety caused by being subjected to a continuous threat is also illustrated by the story of Damocles, who
was seated at a banquet with a sword suspended over his head by a single hair. See 4 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 231 (also defining the phrase "Sword of Damocles" as "an imminent danger, which
may at any moment descend upon one").
36. See Ephesians 4:31-32 ("Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamor, and evil speaking, be put
away from you, with all malice: And be ye kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even as God
for Christ's sake hath forgiven you."); see also Matthew 18:21-35 ("'Lord, how often shall my brother sin against
me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?' Jesus said to him, 'I do not say to you seven times, but seventy
times seven."').
37. But see Holmes, supra note 1, at 476 ("[Wlhy is peace more desirable after twenty years than before?
It is increasingly likely to come without the aid of legislation."). Holmes answered his own rhetorical question by
pointing out that it is precisely because the potential defendant's expectation of repose increases over time that the
importance of protecting those settled expectations also increases. See infra Part III.A.2. (discussing the policy of
avoiding disruption of settled expectations).
38. See, e.g., Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE LJ.
2437, 2466 (1994) ("Thieves deserve no repose from the rightful owner's claim.").
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the cost of undercompensating victims and underdeterring wrongdoers by a strict
application of the statute of limitations is too high.
Obviously, enforcing limitation of actions at all risks some undercompensation
of victims. It is questionable, however, whether preventing peace of mind is an effec-
tive deterrent to wrongdoing. To start with, if a person is undeterred by the risk of
ruinous civil liability, sometimes accompanied by harsh criminal penalties, it is
hardly likely that the marginal increment of deterrence added by a longer limitation
period would make a discernible difference. Moreover, the worst of wrongdoers who
commit the most egregious and offensive wrongs are probably the least risk-averse
and probably feel the least guilt or remorse. They will be the least troubled by the
lingering possibility that they may be apprehended, publicly disgraced, or stripped
of any ill-gotten gains. It is the negligent or unintentional wrongdoer, who accepts
more completely the mores of the community, who may be expected to suffer most
greatly under the self-inflicted lash of conscience and fear of public reproval. The
effect of long limitation periods, then, may be to impose most of the burden of denial
of peace of mind upon the least culpable offenders.
Preventing peace of mind also does not adequately distinguish between the
innocent and the guilty. While some may benefit more than others from the pro-
motion of peace of mind, almost everyone benefits to some degree. Every person,
whether innocent or not, is a potential defendant. No one is immune from suit, ill-
founded though the claims may be. Even the most confident or the most righteous
defendant may find litigating an unfounded claim distracting, time-consuming and
expensive;3 9 and for the ordinary individual, the financial and emotional burden of
potential litigation cannot be underestimated. In addition, our system of justice is
sufficiently imperfect that even the innocent sometimes have reason to fear an
adverse outcome. Thus, promoting peace of mind benefits all members of society,
including the innocent and the risk-averse, not just those who actually have com-
mitted a legal wrong.
The class of those benefitting from peace of mind is not limited to potential
defendants. Witnesses also may have their peace of mind disrupted by long-
outstanding claims. Those who have witnessed an occurrence involving potential
wrongdoing are faced with the possibility that they may be called to testify. For
some, the prospect of testifying causes only minor annoyance; for others, it is anti-
cipated with great dread. Relatively few people, and almost none who have testified
previously, relish the thought.
Does the purpose of promoting "peace of mind" apply to corporations or other
entities, as well as to individuals? Certainly corporations themselves cannot obtain
"peace of mind" in any ordinary sense of that term. Although a corporation or other
business entity may obtain advantages from the limitation of actions against it,
39. See General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (Maraska), 65 Cal. 2d 88, 91,416 P.2d 492,494,52 Cal.
Rptr. 460, 462 (1976) (recognizing that "statutes [of limitation] also protect defendants from being subjected to the
annoyance of an unmeritorious action remaining undecided for an indefinite period of time").
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psychological tranquility is not among them. A legal entity, however, is in part
simply a convenient way of referring to those persons that comprise it, such as its
shareholders, managers and employees.4 Understood in this way, limitation of
actions provides the employees and managers of corporations and other business
entities with peace of mind. This benefit should not be lightly disregarded. Even if
a corporation (or its insurer) ultimately will be able to pay the judgment, the manager
or employee whose act or omission is at issue may find the threat of corporate
liability nearly as worrisome as the risk of personal liability.
There are limits, however, to the extent to which peace of mind may be attained
through a limitation system. First, the limitation bar can only prevent a suit from
being won, not from being filed. As presently constituted, the limitation system
affords a possible defense to a claim, but it does not grant immunity from the
assertion of a claim. Moreover, it is likely that even a defendant with a meritorious
limitation of actions defense will be required to litigate that issue along with the
merits of the plaintiff's claim during pretrial proceedings, and perhaps even at trial.
On the other hand, although a statute of limitations cannot prevent the assertion of
a claim, it can, and no doubt often does, discourage some plaintiffs from filing claims
after the limitation period has expired. Its effectiveness in doing so depends on how
strictly the limitation period is applied: if there are relatively few exceptions, and
they are difficult to satisfy, all but the most tenacious or most seriously wronged
litigants will be deterred; but if there are many exceptions, and they are relatively
easy to establish, many more litigants will be tempted to sue despite the expiration
of the limitation period.
Second, a defendant cannot attain true repose until all possible claims by all
possible claimants arising from an event are barred. This may require decades to
occur, because most limitation periods can be extended by discovery-based accrual
or by one of several tolling doctrines. Taken together, delayed accrual and tolling
may prolong the life of a claim indefinitely, and in most cases there is no absolute
limit on the duration of a limitation period. In recent years, however, the California
Legislature has responded to the possibility of indefinite tolling by enacting a few so-
called "statutes of repose." The effect of such statutes is to subject certain actions to
two limitation periods: a shorter period measured from discovery, which may be
tolled; and a longer period measured from the occurrence of an event, which either
cannot be tolled, or which can be tolled only for limited reasons41 As the name
40. Cf THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrS OF BANKRupTcY LAw 4 (1986) (noting that
"[bankruptcy] law historically has ... allowed for some sort of financial fresh start for individuals" rather than for
corporations, but that "[w]hen the unit involved is a corporation, the 'debtor' is always shorthand terminology for
something else--shareholders, managers, workers or whatever-and we should realize that this something else is
what we are talking about").
41. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982) (requiring an action based upon a latent
construction defect to be commenced within 10 years of the substantial completion of the development or
improvement); id. § 340.5 (West 1982) (requiring a medical malpractice action to be commenced "within three
years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers... the injury, whichever occurs first"); id. §
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implies, such statutes provide relatively greater repose than ordinary statutes of
limitation, but their effectiveness in doing so depends on the number of exceptions
that are permitted, and the ease with which those exceptions may be established.
2. Avoid Disrupting Settled Expectations
A second aspect of repose is respect for expectations that have arisen over time. 42
Regardless of how the status quo was established, human beings eventually come to
accept it, to rely upon it, and to order their affairs in accordance with it.43 A person
may have obtained an asset mistakenly, or even wrongly, but as the years pass he or
she makes investments and other decisions based on the assumption that he or she
will continue to own it.44 At some point, the psychological-and perhaps even moral
-balance begins to tip in favor of the defendant.4 s As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
explained:
The foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked
for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser....
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time,
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however
you came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest
instincts of man.46
340.6 (West 1982) (requiring legal malpractice actions to be commenced "within one year after the plaintiff
discovers ... the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever
occurs first").
42. Cf. 2 SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CoNsTRUCTiON § 41.05 (4th ed. 1992) ("One of the fundamental
considerations of fairness recognized in every legal system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with
respect to substantial interests ought not to be defeated.").
43. There are, of course, limits to the force of this principle. For example, when the wrong is great or is
inflicted maliciously, a new state of affairs may never be accepted as the status quo by those who are disadvantaged
by it. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 799 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that criminal prosecution for murder may be
commenced at any time).
44. Obviously, this principle carries relatively greater force when the defendant is an unintentional, rather
than an intentional, wrongdoer. This distinction helps explain, for example, why the cause of action for fraud is
subject to the discovery rule of accrual and why courts have consistently recognized that fraudulent concealment
tolls the statute. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West 1982); John P. Dawson, Fraudulent
Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MicH. L. REv. 875 (1933).
45. See Patrick J. Kelley, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on
the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1641, 1644 (1978). Kelley stated:
Ordinarily, one wronged by another's conduct will seek legal redress fairly soon after the injury.
Because of this common pattern of behavior the accused wrongdoer may reasonably expect that he will
not be sued long after the event. He may then argue that a long-delayed suit is a wrong to him,
regardless of its substantive merits.
Id.; see also id. at 1645 ('The claimant's inaction has lulled the defendant into a false sense of security. A long-
delayed suit dashes the expectations raised by society and by the caimant's own conduct. The lawsuit is an unfair
surprise.").
46. Holmes, supra note 1, at 477.
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This passage suggests a different way of looking at limitation of actions: that rights
are gained by the defendant, rather than lost by the claimant, because of the passage
of time.47 Under this view, at some point the parties will be viewed as competitors
for an asset instead of victim and wrongdoer. The defendant will be regarded as
possessing a legitimate interest in the maintenance of the current status quo, and the
injury to the plaintiff will be balanced against the injury that the defendant would
suffer if the claim were permitted to proceed.
One of the purposes of a limitation system is to protect this interest in main-
taining a status quo that has become entrenched because of the passage of time,
rather than always leaving open the possibility of returning to an earlier status quo.48
This purpose rests on the recognition that it may be more unjust to permit an old
claim to be revived than it would be to extinguish it.49
California courts have alluded to this policy as one of the justifications for
limitation of actions. As the California Supreme Court has stated: "Limitations
statutes afford repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. 50 Similarly,
the court has mentioned avoiding "surprise" as among the reasons why old claims
47. Holmes's view is best illustrated by the doctrine of adverse possession, which provides that occupancy
of land for the period of time prescribed by the applicable statute of limitation is sufficient to confer title to the land
on the occupant. See, e.g., CAL. CMV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982).
48. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980) ("IThere comes a point at which the delay of
a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely... to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will be
barred without respect to whether it is meritorious.").
49. See JEREMY S. W.LIAMS, LrMrrATION OF AcTIONS IN CANADA 4 (1972) ("[A]fter some time span,
allowing a claim to be brought would create a fresh injury rather than redress the old injury."). This principle has
been acknowledged for centuries. See, e.g., A'Court v. Cross, 130 Eng. Rep. 540, 541 (K.B. 1825) ("Long dormant
claims have often more of cruelty than ofjustice in them."). One court noted:
The individual hardship will, upon the whole, be less, by withholding from one who has slept upon his
right, and never yet possessed it, than to take away from the other what he has long been allowed to
consider as his own, and on the faith of which, the plans in life, habits and experiences of himself and
his family may have been ... unalterably formed and established.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 37 Eng. Rep. 527,577 (K.B. 1820).
50. Guiterrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 899, 705 P.2d 886, 890, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317 (1985); accord
Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consol., Inc., 33 Cal. 3d 604, 615, 659 P.2d 1160, 1167, 189 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878
(1983). This expression of the principle originated in Woody. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879), and was first
cited by the California Supreme Court in Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. 402,406,38 P. 51, 52-53 (1894).
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should be barred,5 1 and has expressed the notion that "the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."52
3. Reduce Uncertainty
A third aspect of repose is the reduction of uncertainty.53 One of the major costs
associated with the passage of time is uncertainty.-4 It is widely believed that most
people are risk-averse, and that as a consequence, uncertainty creates for them
opportunity costs that greater certainty could reduce.55 Regardless of the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, it may be contrary to the interests of society as a whole to dis-
courage even culpable defendants from allocating their resources optimally for long
periods of time. 6 As the California Supreme Court has acknowledged, "the sub-
sidiary aim of the statute of limitations [is] promptly to resolve disputes in order that
commercial and other activities can continue unencumbered by the threat of
litigation."57
The opportunity costs of uncertainty, though hidden, are real. Unasserted
potential claims may prevent or hinder prospective defendants from engaging in busi-
ness transactions, such as financings or mergers, until the risk of liability has been
resolved. Such uncertainty also may limit a potential defendant's ability to allocate
resources most efficiently. Threatened claims or contingent liabilities may inhibit
investment in new ventures, even if the claims are not presently the subject of
51. See Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 (1977)
("Statutes of limitation.., are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost .... ) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)) (emphasis added); see also Pashley v. Pacific Elec.
Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 153 P.2d 325, 326 (1944) ("The underlying purpose of statutes of limitation is to prevent
the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard
by want of prosecution.") (quoting I WOOD, supra note 17, at 8-9); California Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 127
Cal. 107, 110, 59 P. 292, 293 (1899) ("Statutes of limitation are intended to prevent stale claims from springing
up after the lapse of long periods of time, to the surprise of parties or their representatives .... ").
52. Wood, 20 Cal. 3d at 362,572 P.2d at 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (quoting Order ofR.R. Telegraphers,
321 U.S. at 348-49); accord Addison v. State, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317, 578 P.2d 941, 943, 146 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226
(1978).
53. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 39 Cal. 3d 57, 62, 702 P.2d 197,
200, 216 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1985) ("The purpose of any limitations statute is to require 'diligent prosecution of
known claims, thereby providing necessary finality and predictability in legal affairs .... '); I CALVIN W.
CORMAN, LimrrATroNoFAcMONS § 1.1, at 16 (1991) ("Certainty and finality in the administration of affairs is
promoted.") (quoting Kaiser Found. Hosp., 39 Cal. 3d at 62,702 P.2d at 200,216 Cal. Rptr. at 118).
54. See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH.
U. L.Q. 667, 668 (1986) [hereinafter Epstein, Temporal Dimension in Property].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 672 ("A sound system of rights resolves [disputes] early in the process to reduce the legal
uncertainty in subsequent decisions on investment and consumption.").
57. Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410,417 n.4, 525 P.2d 81, 86 n.4, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641, 646 n.4 (1974); see
Developments, supra note 29, at 1185 ("In ordinary private civil litigation, the public policy of limitations lies in
avoiding the disrupting effect that unsettled claims have on commercial intercourse.").
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pending litigation. Potential defendants may feel compelled to put assets aside to
satisfy contingent claims. Whether such consequences are socially beneficial depends
upon the circumstances, but there is no denying that they impose a cost.
Furthermore, there is no denying that those who are employed by, or who seek
to do business with, a potential defendant will bear a portion of the cost of uncer-
tainty. The economic interdependence of individuals in modem life gives rise to a
social interest in the stability of persons and firms, namely, the "protection of the
interest which all persons who deal with a given individual have in the stability and
security of his economic and personal affairs."s As one commentator has explained:
All business dealings of any consequence are apt to depend upon the
financial stability of the parties; and even relations which may be considered
of small importance are posited upon the continued availability of the people
involved. Nearly all legal actions affect either the economic status or the
personal freedom of the defendant; and some affect both. Accordingly, the
public has an interest in the speedy appearance of actions against him.
This social interest in the state of a given person's affairs, translated into
a purpose of statutes of limitations, includes, necessarily, the purposes which
relate solely to the position of the individual defendant. Stability for him is
stability for those with whom he deals. At the same time its scope is wider
than that of any of the individual purposes ascribed to the statutes. The social
purpose is not limited, as are the others, by concern whether a particular
claim against an individual defendant is assumed to be "good" or "bad"; the
disruption is the same with either. And it makes no difference whether the
person directly affected knew of the claim against him, except as his know-
ledge, or lack of it, possibly may be reflected in the "front" which attends his
dealings with others.59
The significance of this rationale is that fairness to third parties-not merely to
the plaintiff or to the defendant-may be affected by untimely claims. For example,
suppose a corporation markets a drug that is discovered twenty years later to have
caused harmful, long-term side effects. Suppose further that the corporation would
be bankrupted by the resulting liability. There is no denying the legitimacy of the
victims' claims for compensation. On the other hand, during those twenty years,
thousands of people may have invested in the corporation, hundreds of people may
have accepted jobs with it, dozens of lenders may have extended credit to it, and
scores of firms may have entered business partnerships with it. As a result of the cor-
poration's liability, those investments may be forfeited, those jobs may be lost, those
loans may not be repaid, and those business partnerships may collapse. While there
58. Callahan, supra note 4, at 138.
59. Id. at 136-37.
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may be justice in the destruction of the corporate defendant, as time passes, the in-
vestors, employees, lenders and business partners acquire reliance interests that may
be disrupted by, and that must be weighed against, the victims' claims to compensa-
tion.60
Plaintiffs also are adversely affected by the uncertainty caused by delay. Suppose
that two parties are involved in a dispute regarding a past transaction for which
liability has not yet been assigned or quantified.
In such a situation, the plaintiff has only a contingent asset-the claim-the
value of which must be discounted by the uncertainty of recovery. The
resources of the defendant are subject to a corresponding possibility of con-
fiscation to pay the plaintiff's demand. Looking at the parties as though they
had joint but indeterminate ownership of the assets available to meet the
claim, it can be seen that at least a portion of the value of the assets is
effectively frozen.61
In these circumstances, the freedom of both parties to plan for the future is
constrained. 62
However, there may be less to this policy than first appears. The use of insurance
to limit and quantify the amount of assets that must be set aside to satisfy potential
claims is widespread. 6 In addition, when the defendant is aware of the existence of
a potential claim, the defendant can reduce the uncertainty by attempting to resolve
the claim promptly, either through negotiation or by filing a declaratory judgment
action.64
4. Reduce Protective Measures and Associated Costs
The fourth aspect of repose, closely related to the third, is the reduction of direct
costs associated with uncertainty. When faced with uncertainty, those who are risk-
averse take protective measures to decrease the likelihood and magnitude of a nega-
60. This rationale is inconsistent with a persistent theme of limitations law: that the statute of limitations
is a personal privilege that may be waived without regard to any public interest it may incidentally promote. See,
e.g., Tebbets v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 155 Cal. 137. 139, 9 P. 501,502 (1909) (describing statutes of limitation as
"statutes of repose, carrying with them, not a right protected by a rule of public policy, but a mere personal right
for the benefit of the individual, which may be waived").
61. FLEM4NG JAMES, JR., GEoFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.3, at 299
(4th ed. 1992).
62. Statutes of limitation also benefit the bona fide purchaser of goods or real property. "Both by making
him secure in his possession after a certain time and by allowing him to rely on the length of time in his prede-
cessor's position, legislatures seek to promote freedom of trade in goods and of alienation of land." Developments,
supra note 29, at 1186.
63. Of course, not all risks are insurable; but even for those that are, the use of insurance imposes costs that
can be reduced by means of a limitation system. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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five outcome. In the absence of uncertainty about whether they will be sued, those
who are risk-averse would not make these investments, or would make more limited
investments. Statutes of limitation, by reducing uncertainty, can help individuals and
businesses reduce the out-of-pocket costs associated with uncertainty, and allow
those resources to be allocated to more socially beneficial uses.
One common protective measure is the acquisition of insurance coverage. It has
been estimated that in about ten percent of reported product liability cases, more than
ten years had elapsed between product sale and product-related injury.6 The cost and
availability of insurance may be adiversely affected by such long "tails" of liability. 66
Three considerations may make insuring against older claims more costly. First, the
longer the "tail" period, the more difficult it is for an insurer to predict the number
of claims that will be filed, so insurers typically charge very high rates for long tail
periods.67 Second, the costs of such long-deferred claims are difficult to estimate with
accuracy because their future value may be heavily influenced by inflation rates.
Third, it is more difficult to diversify the risk of insuring against potential future lia-
bility if manufacturers purchase insurance coverage than if consumers purchase their
own coverage directly, especially if the applicable legal standard is subject to
change.69 Attempts to compensate for these types of uncertainty have resulted in
higher rates, unavailability of coverage, or changes in the nature of coverage offered
from "occurrence" policies to "claims made" policies in some markets. This, in turn,
has forced or encouraged some firms to risk bankruptcy by "going bare." The result
may be undercompensation of victims, underdeterrence of wrongdoers, and sub-
optimal incentives to prevent losses.70 In extreme instances, the cost of liability in-
surance may even cause some firms and individuals to adopt overly-cautious
behavior or to cease doing business altogether!'
65. Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796,
813 (1983). The same study estimated that in more than 50% of reported cases, injury occurred within two years
of manufacture. Id. Another study estimated that for all goods, 83.1% of injuries occurred within one year of manu-
facture, and only 2.8% occurred more than 10 years after manufacture; but that for capital goods, only 38.3% of
injuries occurred within one year, and 16.5% occurred more than 10 years after manufacture. Michael M. Martin,
A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 745,752-54 (1982).
66. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE W. 1521, 1575-76
(1987). The term "tail" refers to the shape of a graph with product-liability claims paid on the vertical axis and years
from manufacture on the horizontal axis. Because the majority of claims are paid within one or two years from
manufacture, and a smaller percentage of claims are paid many years in the future, the resulting graph is shaped
like a tail. See Martin, supra note 65, at 746 n.13.
67. See Michael J. Byrne, Comment, Let Truth Be Their Devise: Hargett v. Holland and the Professional
Malpractice Statute of Repose, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2224 n. 11 (1995).
68. See Jo ANN FELtX, A LAwYER's GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACrICE INSURANCE 13-14 (1982).
69. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517, 540 (1984).
70. Id.
71. For example, it has been argued that drug manufacturers have been deterred from developing new
vaccines due to the cost of liability insurance. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 44 Cal. 3d 1049,
1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988) (stating that "[t]he possibility that the cost of insurance
and of defending against lawsuits will diminish the availability and increase the price of pharmaceuticals is far from
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The California Legislature has occasionally acknowledged the goal of reducing
insurance premiums in enacting statutes of limitation. For example, the legislature
enacted § 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1970, and amended it in 1975, in
response to a perceived "crisis" in the cost and availability of medical malpractice
insurance.72 Similar concerns prompted the 1977 enactment of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure § 340.6, applicable to legal malpractice claims. 3
Despite scholarly support and legislative and executive pronouncements, not
everyone accepts the notion that limitation of actions rules that supposedly are too
generous to plaintiffs have increased the cost or decreased the availability of
insurance.7 4 At least one court has scoffed at the idea that insurance rates could be
reduced by modifying the statute of limitations, and described the likely significance
of such measures as "more fanciful than real." 75 Regardless of whether there was or
is an insurance crisis or a "long tail" problem, however, it is likely that limitation of
actions rules have had some effect on the cost and availability of insurance. It is also
likely that any such effect is far more modest than the effect produced by the sub-
stantive rules of liability.
Another common protective measure against uncertainty is the retention of per-
sonal and business records for substantial periods of time, so that evidence of trans-
actions that may be disputed in the future remains available. Statutes of limitation can
help reduce the cost and burden of keeping records for long periods of time. With a
fixed and ascertainable limitation period, it is clear when records may safely be
destroyed. Without a clear statute of limitations, potential defendants may choose
instead to incur the cost of additional storage and pass it on to their customers. That
theoretical," and collecting examples).
72. See 1975 Cal. Stat., 2d Extra. Sess. ch. 2, sec. 11, at 4407 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5)
("There is a crises in health care in California because of the inability of many physicians and surgeons to secure
malpractice insurance which may cause many of them to leave the private practice of medicine. To help solve this
problem, it is imperative that this act take effect immediately."); see also 1975 Cal. Stat., 2d Extra. Sess. at 3947
(noting the proclamation of Governor Brown convening the legislature in extraordinary session, stating "[i]t is
critical that the Legislature enact laws which will ... reduce the costs which underlie these high [malpractice]
insurance premiums" and asking the legislature to consider, among other things, "setting a reasonable statute of
limitations for the filing of [medical] malpractice claims"); Paul E. Caprioglio, Comment, A Four Year Statute of
Limitations for Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintifs Case Be Barred?, 2 PAc. LJ. 663, 668 (1971)
(describing § 340.5 as "new legislation designed to reduce the premiums of malpractice insurance for the medical
profession"); Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7 PAc. L.J. 544, 544-46 (1976) (describing the
malpractice crisis and response).
73. See Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417,429, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917,
923 (1981) (noting that "in several of the committee reports it is stated that the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 298
was to reduce the costs of legal malpractice insurance"), disapproved in part on other grounds, Laird v. Blacker,
2 Cal. 4th 606, 828 P.2d 691, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1992); see also id. at 428, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 922 (noting that
"It]he bill as eventually enacted retains much of the wording as Mallen's proposed statute"); Ronald E. Mallen, A
Statute of Limitationsfor Lawyers, 52 CAL ST. Bus. L 22, 22 (1971) (describing increase in premiums and decline
in the number of companies providing legal malpractice insurance and proposing a remedial statute).
74. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1001 (Ala. 1982) (describing the so-
called "long tail" problem as one which "has not been documented").
75. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670. 683 (Utah 1985).
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cost burden is imposed on all members of society for the benefit of a small group,
namely, the relatively small subset of plaintiffs who either are not diligent or whose
loss does not manifest itself for a lengthy period of time. Although in recent years the
costs of information storage have declined, the aggregate cost to society remains suf-
ficiently large to merit consideration of such costs in formulating limitation policy.7 6
B. Minimize Deterioration of Evidence
Another of the principal policies underlying statutes of limitation is the policy
of avoiding deterioration of evidence. As the California Supreme Court stated:
It is fundamental that the principal purpose of statutes of limitation is to
prevent the assertion of stale claims by plaintiffs who have failed to file their
action until evidence is no longer fresh and witnesses are no longer avail-
able .... The statutes, accordingly, serve a distinct public purpose, pre-
venting the assertion of demands which, through the unexcused lapse of
time, have been rendered difficult or impossible to defend."
Like the policy of promoting repose, however, avoiding deterioration of evidence
serves several distinct but overlapping purposes: (a) to ensure accuracy in fact-
finding; (b) to prevent the assertion of fraudulent claims; (c) to reduce the costs of
litigation; and (d) to preserve the integrity of the legal system. Each of these four
purposes will be considered in turn.
1. Ensure Accurate Fact-Finding
The most important reason for avoiding deterioration of evidence is that the
deterioration or loss of evidence makes the accurate and just adjudication of claims
76. As a leading treatise notes:
One of the mundane realities of modem business life is the expense involved in the physical storage of
documents. Cataloging, packaging, and providing security for stored documents is a substantial
undertaking. Large business organizations may generate tens of millions of pages of documents each
month. This inundation of paper may overwhelm even the most orderly of document control systems.
JANICE S. GORELICH ET AL., DESTRUCTION Op EVIDENCE § 10.2, at 310 (1989).
77. Addison v. State, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317, 578 P.2d 941, 942-43, 146 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226 (1978); see
Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 152, 702 P.2d 563, 566, 216 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (1985) ("[S]tatutes
[of limitation] were enacted to promote the trial of the case before evidence is lost or'destroyed, and before
witnesses become unavailable or their memories dim."); Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Workers Compensation Appeals
Bd., 39 Cal. 3d 57, 61,702 P.2d 197, 200, 216 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1985) ("The purpose of any limitation statute
is to require 'diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby.., ensuring that claims will be resolved while the
evidence bearing on the issues is reasonably available and fresh.'"); Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362,
572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 (1977) ("Statutes of limitations ... are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.") (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,348 (1944)).
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less likely.78 The United States Supreme Court summed up this rationale for
limitation of actions memorably when it stated:
The process of discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate
facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more
reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh. Thus in the
judgment of most legislatures and courts, there comes a point at which the
delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to impair
the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset settled expectations that
a substantive claim will be barred without respect to whether it is
meritorious.79
This justification of the limitation system rests on three premises. The first is that
the minimization of error in adjudication is a goal of the legal system. The second is
that, on balance, evidence deteriorates with the passage of time. The third is that the
effects of such deterioration on the accuracy of the legal system can be avoided by
barring all cases commenced after the limitation period has expired.
The first premise is sound. Avoiding inaccurate fact-finding is an important goal
of our legal system.0 "The greater the level of accuracy, the fewer innocent in-
dividuals are sanctioned and the more guilty are sanctioned."8' This is important for
at least two reasons. First, punishing an innocent defendant with civil liability is no
less unjust than denying compensation to a deserving victim.82 Shifting a plaintiff's
78. See, e.g., California Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 127 Cal. 107, 110,59 P. 292,293 (1899) ("Statutes
of limitation are intended to prevent stale claims from springing up after the lapse of long periods of time... when
loss of papers, deaths of witnesses, and worn-out recollections make the presentation of the actual facts in the case
impossible or extremely difficult."); Los Angeles County v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 84 Cal. App. 2d 575, 580,
191 P.2d 78, 82 (1948) ("Statutes of limitation are designed to prevent the resurgence of stale claims after the lapse
of long periods of time as a result of which loss of papers, disappearance of witnesses, [and] feeble recollections,
make ineffectual or extremely difficult a fair presentation of the case.").
79. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980); see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. I 11,
117 (1979) (asserting that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases
in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance
of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise"); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351, 360
(1828) (noting that statutes of limitation "afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction
may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses").
80. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J. L. & ECON. 1,
1 (1994) ("The degree of accuracy is a central concern of adjudication."); Daniel R. Ortiz, Neoactuarialsm:
Comment on Kaplow (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 403 (1994) ("Accuracy is a central, if not the central, value of
adjudication."); see also Stephen McG. Bundy, Valuing Accuracy-Filling Out the Framework: Comment on
Kaplow (2). 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,433 (1994) ("Accuracy is a central aspiration of any procedural system, but
it cannot be the only aspiration"). See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
81. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 80, at 347.
82. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BAStC CONCEPTS OFLEGALTHOUGHT 79-80 (1996) (arguing that the
debate between Abraham and God regarding the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah shows that "even God is
bound by the principle that it is unjust to punish the innocent").
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loss to an innocent defendant merely substitutes one victim for another. Second, in-
accurate adjudication decreases deterrence. If an individual is about as likely to be
punished regardless of whether he or she commits a wrong that will result in some
personal benefit, there is little incentive to refrain from wrongdoing.
There is some justification, however, for questioning the importance of accuracy
as a goal.83 To start with, the value of accuracy may depend on the context. For
example, in criminal cases there may be sound reasons to prefer certain types of
inaccurate outcomes over others.84 Accuracy may also be more.socially desirable in
some types of civil cases than in others.85 Moreover, from the perspective of legal
realists, accuracy is almost always an unobtainable ideal.86 To some, this suggests
that we ought not worry too much about accuracy and that we should view ad-
judication simply as a method of resolving disputes.87 To others, it suggests that it is
even more urgent that we not further increase inaccuracy by basing decisions on less
than the best possible information.88
On balance, however, even though greater accuracy comes at a cost, it remains
an important objective in virtually all cases. If our goal were simply to resolve
controversies, that could be accomplished quickly and inexpensively by flipping a
coin. Such decisions, however, would lack legitimacy8 9 They also would fail to
implement substantive law policy because, if the coin were fair, the decisions would
be wrong approximately fifty percent of the time.90 We go to the trouble and expense
83. Cf. Holmes, supra note I, at 466 (describing the loss or deterioration of evidence as a "secondary
matter").
84. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court noted:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more
serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an
erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor .... In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the
social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who
is guilty.
Id.; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 80, at 361.
85. See Bundy, supra note 80, at 431 (suggesting that accuracy may be more important in individual civil
rights, tort, and employment claims pitting individuals against organizations because defendints in such cases "have
only a hazy sense of how much harm they are doing").
86. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14-16 (1949)
(explaining that "facts are guesses").
87. See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs.
243, 244 (1988) ("Of course, the principal purpose of the legal process is not to obtain answers, but to resolve
disputes.").
88. See FRANK, supra note 86, at 36 ("Mhe unattainability of the ideal [of justice] is no excuse for shirking
the effort to obtain the best available.").
89. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 840-41 (1984) (describing the outrage that resulted
when ajudge flipped a coin to determine whether a convicted defendant would serve 20 or 30 days in jail).
90. See Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1181 (1986)
[hereinafter Epstein, Temporal Dimension in Tort Law]. Epstein noted:
If factual determinations are less than 100 percent reliable, there is a loss in making social objectives
operational, whether the objective is compensation or deterrence, liberty or efficiency.... If the factual
determinations are only 50 percent correct, then there is no reason for the rule at all, because the effect
upon primary conduct is at best random ....
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of discovery and trial because we believe that the process produces results that will
be accepted as legitimate and will usually be correct.
The second premise also appears to be amply supported. Certainly, it is widely
believed that evidence deteriorates as time passes,91 and this belief is supported by
our common experience and intuition. Therefore, reducing the lapse of time between
the event and filing (or, perhaps more important, between the event and adjudication)
is almost certainly worthwhile.g2 In assessing the weight of the second premise, how-
ever, it is necessary to ask how rapidly and how consistently evidence deteriorates
over time.
The rate at which evidence deteriorates is neither uniform nor easily measured.
There is, however, some empirical data regarding the rate at which memories
deteriorate that sheds light on this issue. In general, "forgetting tends to occur very
rapidly during the initial period after learning and.., the rate of forgetting declines
significantly thereafter."93 More specifically, it has been estimated that human beings
recall about sixty percent of what they learn after twenty minutes, and less than forty
percent after nine hours.94 The rate of deterioration slows so rapidly, however, that
after thirty days about twenty-five percent is still remembered. 5
The initial steepness of the memory degradation curve suggests that measures to
decrease the lapse of time between event and adjudication reach a point of dim-
inishing return very rapidly. After just one day, sixty to seventy percent of what was
observed is forgotten. The difference in what is recalled between one year and four
years, on the other hand, is comparatively slight. If we assume that limitation periods
Id.
91. See id. ("With the passage of time, the evidence available regarding a given legal issue necessarily
becomes stale."); id. at 1182 ("The longer the period between operative fact and legal judgment, the more likely
it is that error will creep in: memories will fade, evidence will disappear or become unreliable."); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399,466 (1973)
("Court delay increases error costs ... because evidence decays, over time, increasing the probability of an
erroneous decision."); Peter V. Letsou, Comment, A Time-Dependent Model of Products Liability, 53 U. CHtt. L.
REV. 209,227 (1986) ("mhe passage of time magnifies uncertainty and evidentiary problems.").
92. Striving to reduce deterioration of evidence by limitation of actions is also warranted by the existence
of two other types of errors that can never be eliminated entirely. The first type is errors of law, some of which will
occur regardless of the quality of the evidence presented on factual issues. The second type is mistaken
determinations of fact attributable not to poor evidence, but rather to human fallibility. Because these two types of
errors inevitably reduce the accuracy of outcomes even when the evidence is fresh, it is important that the
deterioration of evidence be kept to a minimum so that the improvement of the results generated by the legal system
over random decisions remains as large as possible.
93. RICHARD H. E'INGER ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE, BEHAVIOR, AND LIFE 269 (3d ed. 1994).
94. Id. at 250.
95. Id. There also may be considerable variation in the amount of recall, depending upon a variety of factors
other than the passage of time. One author has concluded that the ability to recall a face depends upon a variety of
factors in addition to the passage of time, including the duration of exposure, the unusualness of the facial features,
and the degree of retroactive interference with the image. Though "delay intervals even as long as weeks or months
do not automatically reduce recognition accuracy," the author concludes that there is little deterioration until about
three months, but substantial deterioration by eleven months. See Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face
Afemory, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 12, 24-25 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus eds., 1984).
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of a few minutes, hours or days are too short to be practical, the question then be-
comes whether it is worth depriving a plaintiff of a claim because of his or her
inability or unwillingness to sue before the memory of witnesses has declined from,
say, twenty-five percent to twenty percent. The answer, of course, depends in part
on the importance of what is lost. The difficulty is that there is no generally appli-
cable standard by which we can measure how much detail is necessary to determine
factual issues accurately.
Changes in society and technology play a role in determining the rate at which
evidence deteriorates. For example, there is greater mobility in society today than in
the past, meaning that witnesses are relatively more likely to have relocated than they
were 100 years ago. On the other hand, people tend to live longer today, and due to
more systematic record keeping and intensive government regulation, people tend to
be easier to find. Moreover, because the storage of records is less expensive than it
used to be, it is likely that records are kept for a longer period.96 Some of these
effects, of course, may also be the result of changes in the law of limitation of
actions. By adopting longer limitation periods or changing from event-based accrual
to discovery-based accrual, legislatures and courts may have stimulated changes in
recordkeeping behavior, resulting in the retention of records for a longer period of
time.
The validity of the second premise also depends on the extent to which dete-
rioration of evidence is consistent. Although the premise that evidence deteriorates
with the passage of time is more likely to be true than false, it is not always true.
There are old cases in which the evidence may be perfectly adequate, such as a claim
based almost entirely upon documents that happen to have been preserved. More-
over, evidence sometimes improves with the passage of time. For example, it has
been suggested that, in tort cases involving toxic substances, encouraging early filing
actually diminishes the accuracy of fact-finding because it forces a decision on
liability and damages before all of the harmful effects may be discernible. 8 This
effect is exacerbated by the singlejudgment rule, which provides that a plaintiff must
bring a single action for all injuries sustained as a result of a single tort." Some
courts have justified exceptions to the single judgment rule on the ground that "evi-
dence relating to the central issues in a latent disease case-the existence of the
96. Cf. JEREMY RIFKIN, TIME WARS 182 (1982) (arguing that, in the computer age, "[ijnformation can be
preserved against the ravages of time. It does not rot and decay; it does not get used up").We cannot be certain,
however, that the durability of electronic storage can be assured.
97. The importance of these trends may be affected by changes in other aspects of the legal system. During
the 1600s, for example, parties were prohibited from testifying in their own cases. WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193-97 (3d ed. 1944). Because this rule artificially reduced the number of available
witnesses, the overall quality of information regarding a claim was even more vulnerable to the death or
unavailability of a witness than is true today. See Kelley, supra note 45, at 1646.
98. See generally Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitation in Toxic Substances Litigation,
76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 989-1003 (1988).
99. Id. at 1002; see, e.g., Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1611, 1622,2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 802 (1991).
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disease, its proximate cause, and the resultant damage-'tends to develop, rather than
disappear, as time passes."" The problem, however, is more complex than this
view suggests. Evidence of the existence and extent of a disease or condition may
improve with time because the disease may not have been detectable by the plaintiff
at an early date. Evidence regarding proximate cause, on the other hand, is subject
to competing influences. Evidence of a toxic agent's capacity to cause disease im-
proves with time; but evidence concerning each individual plaintiff's exposure to the
toxic agent deteriorates over time.'' Moreover, as time passes, other conditions may
intrude upon the causal chain and make the allocation of causation and damages
more, rather than less, difficult. Obviously, the more time that passes, the more likely
it is that other causes will intrude. 102 This effect, however, may be partially offset by
improvements in scientific knowledge and detection technology, which may make
it easier to demonstrate exposure and to distinguish among known causes despite the
passage of time."3
Similarly, evidence regarding remedies sometimes improves as time passes.
t 4
It is generally more difficult to predict the future than to reconstruct the past. In a
personal injury case, the extent of the plaintiff's impairment will be an important
question. The answer to this question may be a matter of speculation after just one
year but may be perfectly clear after three years. 5 Likewise, projecting the amount
of profits a business would have obtained during the period Year-5 through Year-10
may be more accurately accomplished during Year-4 than during Year-1. While we
tend to think of changes in the evidence regarding liability as being more significant,
and to downplay the importance of changes in the evidence regarding damages, they
are arguably of equal importance from the perspectives of deterrence and com-
pensation.1' The effectiveness of the legal system may be compromised not simply
100. Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983) (quoting Wilson v. Johns.
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); cf. Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105
Cal. App. 3d 316,322-27, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591,594-97 (1980) (permitting exception to single judgment rule in case
involving latent disease).
101. See Green, supra note 98, at 998-99.
102. The problem of supervening causes has been advanced as one justification for the 10-year statute of
repose for latent defects in improvements to real property. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982);
Michael F. Boyle & Leslie M. Hastings, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 33Z1 and 33Z15: Defective
Construction Defect Statutes, 21 PAc. L.J. 235, 245 & n.49 (1990).
103. Cf. Green, supra note 98, at 1000 n.147.
104. Cf. Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal. 2d 282, 290, 449 P.2d 737, 742-43, 74 Cal. Rptr. 521, 526-27
(1969) (asserting that the purpose of notice of claim statutes "is best served if the entire sequence of events giving
rise to the injury is regarded as the occurrence from which the damage arose for damages can be assessed accurately
only when the sequence is completed and the total injury taken into account"). But see Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal.
3d 502,515, 535 P.2d 1161, 1169, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,713 (1975) ("To delay the running of the period of limitation
until defendant's acts furnished plaintiff with a more certain proof of damages would contravene the principle that
victims of legal wrong should make reasonable efforts to avoid incurring further damage.").
105. See Green, supra note 98, at 1001-03.
106. See Posner, supra note 91, at 401 (defining the cost of errors as "the product of two factors, the
probability of error and the cost if an error occurs").
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by exonerating wrongdoers or by condemning the innocent, but also by imposing on
wrongdoers (and awarding to victims) an amount of damages that is either too small
or too large. There is no reason to believe, however, that either plaintiffs or defen-
dants are systematically disadvantaged by the deterioration or improvement of
evidence of damages over time. Injuries, for example, may turn out to be either more
severe or less severe-than initially projected.
In short, it may be that evidence merely changes, rather than deteriorates, over
time. This has significant implications for the justification of limitation of actions as
a means of improving accuracy in adjudication. Even assuming that, broadly
speaking, evidence tends to deteriorate over time, there are nontrivial classes of cases
in which a countervailing force is at work. If the principal goal of the limitation
system is to avoid inaccurate fact-finding resulting from the deterioration of evi-
dence, then some cases may need to be treated differently. This can be accomplished
either by taking differences regarding the deterioration of evidence into account in
creating a classification scheme, or by permitting judicial discretion to depart from
the limitation system in individual cases.
The limitation system relies in part on classification of claims to compensate for
differences regarding the deterioration of evidence. Arguably, some types of cases
are more likely to rely upon documentary evidence (which is relatively enduring)
than upon eyewitness testimony (which is relatively transient). As to the former, it
is tempting to conclude that longer limitation periods might be appropriate since the
risk of deterioration of evidence is low.' 7 Although it is possible to generalize to
some degree about the type of evidence that will be relevant to a claim, such
generalizations will not always be valid, either as to a class of claims or as to
particular claims within a class. To the extent that such generalizations are unsound,
limitation of actions will fail to promote accurate fact-finding. Absent empirical data,
therefore, such generalizations are risky.
The third premise underlying this justification for limitation systems-that
limitation of actions will improve accuracy by eliminating claims that are filed after
a fixed period of time-is subject to question. Limitation of actions is a rather blunt
instrument for ensuring accuracy. Unless one makes the implausible assumption that
all claims filed after the limitation period has expired lack merit, a statute of limi-
tation will bar meritorious claims as well as unmeritorious ones. Therefore, in deter-"
mining the accuracy of the legal system as a whole, some percentage of the cases in
which the defendant prevailed on the ground of limitation of actions should be
included among the percentage of inaccurate or substantively incorrect outcomes. 0 8
107. This intuition probably explains the difference between the four-year period for actions based on written
contracts and the two-year period for actions based on oral contracts. Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West
1982) (providing four-year period for a contract founded upon an instrument in writing) with id. § 339 (West Supp.
1997) (providing two-year period for contract not founded upon an instrument in writing).
108. This consequence of statutes of limitation also has implications for other policies underlying limitation
of actions, such as the policies of encouraging the prompt enforcement of the substantive law and reducing the
number of unmeritorious claims filed. See infra Parts Ii.E., G.2. (discussing these other policies underlying
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This has led one scholar to conclude that the policy of avoiding deterioration of
evidence is an insufficient justification for statutes of limitation:
If it is assumed that a plaintiff's claim is "good," the defendant will be no
worse off no matter how much time has elapsed; he couldn't have defended
successfully in the beginning. Statutes of limitations probably are designed
to bar "good" as well as "bad" claims; but the purpose in barring the "good"
is something other than protection against failure of evidence.' °9
Moreover, the extent to which a limitation system can reduce the deterioration
of evidence prior to the time of trial is limited. Although a statute of limitation can
limit the time within which a suit may be filed, and thereby encourage the plaintiff
to file within that period, at that point the role of limitation of actions ends. Because
the parties can take steps to preserve the remaining evidence, the rate at which
evidence deteriorates after the filing of a complaint is diminished, but some
deterioration still takes place. If the principal concern is with the quality of evidence
available for presentation to the trier of fact, an attempt should be made to minimize
the period between the events at issue and the time of adjudication, rather than the
period between the events at issue and the commencement of the action." °
Although the discussion of this policy has concentrated on assessing the effect
of deterioration of evidence on the accuracy of adjudication, it should be recognized
that the overwhelming majority of cases are settled or resolved on motion prior to
trial,' and that deterioration also may adversely affect the likelihood and fairness
of settlements. Other things being equal, uncertainty regarding the probable outcome
of adjudication makes settlement less likely. 112 Thus, the ability of the parties to reach
a settlement will be reduced whenever the effect of deterioration of evidence is to
increase, rather than to decrease, uncertainty regarding the likely outcome. If the
quality of evidence has improved with the passage of time, on the other hand, settle-
ment may be encouraged. Deterioration of evidence also may promote settlement
when the deterioration disproportionately affects one party to the detriment of the
other. For example, if the only witness favorable to the defendant dies during a
lengthy prefiling delay, making a verdict for the plaintiff almost inevitable, the
limitation of actions).
109. Callahan, supra note 4, at 134 (citation omitted).
110. Currently, California law allows three years after filing in which to serve the defendant and five years
after filing in which to bring an action to trial. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 583.210,583.310 (West Supp. 1997).
For most cases, however, these periods are drastically reduced under applicable fast-track rules. See infra notes 137-
38 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162-
64 (1986) (estimating that parties resolve 22% of cases by trial, motion, or arbitration); Robert I. Weil, This Judge
for Hire, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 41, 42 (estimating that out of every 100 cases filed, 67 settle, 30 are decided
on motion, and only three are tried).
112. See Posner, supra note 91, at 423 (explaining that "a reduction in the variance between the parties'
estimates of the probability of prevailing and the true probability will [generally] increase the settlement rate").
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parties' predictions of the likely outcome will be about the same. In this situation,
however, even though the likelihood of settlement will be increased, the fairness of
the settlement will be compromised in the same way that the fairness or accuracy of
adjudication is compromised by deterioration of evidence.
2. Prevent Fraud
Because the deterioration of evidence may make it more difficult to decide
claims correctly, limiting the time within which actions can be filed may help to
check the temptation to resort to fraud in filing or litigating claims.'13 This purpose
rests on the premise that the longer the gap in time between the events at issue and
trial on the merits, the more vulnerable the defendant is to spurious claims. It has two
aspects: first, to prevent fraudulent claims from succeeding; and second, to prevent
the use of fraudulent evidence in support of nonfraudulent claims. The class of non-
fraudulent claims includes both meritorious claims and unmeritorious claims asserted
in good faith.
It is possible that the deterioration of evidence may place fraudulent and genuine
claims on a relatively equal footing. If the plaintiff files suit after many years, when
all of the witnesses to the events on which the claim is based have died except the
plaintiff and the defendant, and if the deceased witnesses would have favored the
defendant, then clearly the defendant's position has been weakened. The defendant
now has one witness (himself or herself) instead of five (himself or herself and four
others) to rebut the plaintiff's testimony. Assuming that the plaintiff and the defen-
dant are equally credible, 1"4 then the plaintiff' s chances of success are about fifty per-
cent. The effect may be to transform a plainly fraudulent claim into one that pos-
sesses a realistic hope of success. In addition, as evidence deteriorates, witnesses gain
freedom in how they characterize or relate past events because there is less evidence
remaining to constrain them. This freedom increases the likelihood that claims,
whether meritorious or not, may be decided on the basis of testimony that is either
fraudulent or mistaken. It is difficult to support such generalizations, however,
because there is substantial variation from one case to the next. In some instances,
for example, the deterioration of evidence will adversely affect the plaintiff, either
113. See Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226,231, 153 P.2d 325,328 (1944) ("[Tihe very purpose
of the statute of limitations [is] to prevent fraud and not to make it secure and successful."); llse v. Burgess, 28 Cal.
App. 2d 654, 657, 83 P.2d 527, 529 (1938) ("The underlying purpose of the statute of limitations is to prevent stale
claims which may be prosecuted fraudulently when the debtor is unable, from lapse of time, to make his defense.");
Sing v. Barker, 122 Cal. App. 93, 100, 10 P.2d 92, 95 (1932) ("Statutes of limitation... militate against pejury
and fraud."); 1 WOOD, supra note 17, at 8 ("Mhe object of (statutes of limitation] is to prevent fraudulent and stale
actions from springing up after a great lapse of time.") (citation omitted); see also Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142, 145 (N.Y. 1963) ('[Plerhaps the possibility of feigned cases against unprepared
defendants and the difficulties of proof in meritorious cases led to a decision that society is best served by complete
repose after a certain number of years even at the sacrifice of a few unfortunate cases.").
114. This assumption rests, in turn, on the questionable (and, if true, disturbing) assumption that the trier of
fact will find an honest defendant and a lying plaintiff equally credible.
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because the plaintiffs evidence has decayed but the defendant's evidence has not,
or because the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion and is more likely to lose if
there is uncertainty regarding the merits of a claim.
This policy seems a questionable ground on which to base limitation of actions.
There is always some risk of fraud. There is no reason, however, to believe that
plaintiffs are more likely than defendants to fabricate evidence or to lie on the wit-
ness stand 1 5 The problem of fraudulent claims also correlates poorly with the
passage of time. Except in special circumstances (such as when a plaintiff relies on
an alleged agreement with the decedent), there is no reason to assume that the evi-
dence favorable to the defendant will deteriorate more rapidly than the evidence
favorable to the plaintiff. Other measures, such as the statute of frauds and the parol
evidence rule, could be employed to help ensure that evidence is of a substantial and
reliable character before it is introduced. These measures, if well designed and
meaningfully enforced,1 6 could be more precisely tuned to addressing the risk of
litigation-related fraud when circumstances warrant judicial intervention.
3. Reduce Litigation Costs
Another policy served by limitation of actions is the reduction of transaction
costs associated with lawsuits that are filed, both for the parties involved and for the
legal system as a whole. This policy rests on the premise that, because of the
deterioration of evidence, it is more costly to litigate claims based on remote events
than it is to litigate claims based on recent events 1 7
The validity of this assumption depends upon the type of claim, the type of evi-
dence, and the circumstances of each case. On the one hand, it may be more time-
consuming and expensive to locate witnesses, assemble the relevant documents and
reconstruct what happened if the events are remote in time. In addition, disputes over
collateral issues, such as possible liability for spoliation of evidence and whether
115. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1189 n.127 ("The danger that plaintiffs will waste resources asserting
frivolous or extortionate claims seems not greatly different from the danger that defendants will waste resources
by setting up frivolous or extortionate defenses"). Indeed, it is possible that more people would be willing to lie
when they are subjected to pressure, such as being sued, than would be willing to initiate fraudulent litigation,
116. One difficulty is that many of these devices have been relaxed in order to permit litigants to present facts
more fully. See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222,225-28,436 P.2d 561,563-65, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545,547-49
(1968) (permitting introduction of parol evidence to prove alleged collateral agreement); Sunset-Stemau Food Co.
v. Bonzi, 60 Cal. 2d 834, 838 n.3, 389 P.2d 133, 136 n.3, 36 Cal. Rptr. 741,744 n.3 (1964) ("The commentators
almost unanimously urge that considerations of policy indicate a restricted application of the statute of frauds, if
not its total abolition."). This development parallels a similar relaxation in the strictness with which courts have
applied limitation of actions.
117. See Danzon, supra note 69, at 534 ("[Dlelay leads to decay of evidence, blurs the chain of causation,
adds multiple defendants, and hence increases litigation expense."); Epstein, Temporal Dimension in Tort Law,
supra note 90, at 1182 ("The passage of time is positively correlated with both of the costs just identified: the
expense of litigation and the error rate."); Letsou, supra note 91, at 227 ("[A]ny liability rule-whether strict
liability or negligence-becomes more costly and difficult to enforce over time.") (emphasis omitted).
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adverse inferences may be drawn from the loss or destruction of evidence, are more
likely to arise. On the other hand, if witnesses have disappeared or died, there will
be fewer witnesses to depose during discovery or to examine at trial. 18If documents
have been lost or destroyed, there will be fewer documents to be collected and
analyzed during discovery or to be introduced into evidence at trial. While this may
tend to reduce litigation costs to some extent, it is more likely that litigation costs,
measured either in dollars or time, are increased by the passage of time. Experience
suggests that many litigants will respond to the loss of evidence by investing more
resources in an attempt to remedy the deficiency." 9 Thus, to the extent that statutes
of limitation encourage plaintiffs to file claims promptly, they probably do result in
a net reduction in litigation costs.' 20
4. Preserve the Integrity of the Legal System
Sometimes perception is nearly as important as reality. 21 Courts do not want to
be, and do not want to be perceived to be, haphazard guessers about facts. Not only
would this be demeaning to the legal system, but it would breed disrespect for the
political system as well. If it were widely believed that judicial decisions are no more
accurate than tossing a coin, courts would lose their legitimacy as a forum for the
resolution of disputes, and disputants would seek their remedies elsewhere.'2 Thus,
if society believes that evidence deteriorates over time, and that erroneous decisions
are more likely to occur if the gap in time between underlying events and adjudi-
cation is lengthy, then statutes of limitation enhance the legitimacy of the legal
system by promoting the appearance of rational decisionmaking.
118. Taking this notion to its logical extreme, one author has suggested that the passage of time could result
in highly efficient litigation:
"I would think," said Alice, "that everybody involved in the case must have died years ago. How
can you have a trial when nobody is left who remembers what happened?"
"No problem at all," said Tweedledum.
"Contrariwise," added Tweedledee. "It's when you have witnesses around that there's trouble.
They're likely to surprise you by remembering something at the last minute they hadn't thought of
before. When they're all dead, there's no chance of any surprises, which makes things much neater and
fairer."
"If I had my way" Tweedledum remarked, "I would make it against the law to have a trial while
anyone was still alive who might remember something about the case."
PETER F. SLOSS, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN JURISPRUDENTIA 22 (1982).
119. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 80, at 342, 384 (noting that parties have incentives to
present excessive evidence in adjudication).
120. See 1 CORMAN, supra note 53, § 1.1, at 16 ("Judicial efficiency is the reward when these statutes [of
limitation] produce speedy and fair adjudication of the rights of the parties.").
121. See generally Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. I1, 14 (1954) ("Justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.").
122. There is empirical support for the proposition that beliefs about the accuracy of a procedure are an
important determinant of whether the procedure is perceived as fair or conducive to just outcomes. See TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 120 (1990).
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An analogy to sporting events is useful. Consider, for example, the practice of
stopping play in a baseball game that has been interrupted by rain or overtaken by
darkness. These conditions increase the role played by chance, and narrow the gap
between the skilled and unskilled.1mAt some point, the conditions may interfere with
the way in which the game is supposed to be played to the point that the contest is
no longer viewed as legitimate and is not worth playing at all. It may be preferable
to let the result of the first five innings stand instead of completing the game under
circumstances when extraneous factors, rather than the relative strengths of the
opposing teams, may determine the outcome. This same insight is part of the basis
for limitation of actions. One crucial difference, however, is that baseball games are
either postponed or decided on the basis of the first five innings, whereas litigation
called on account of limitation is abandoned without resolution on the merits.
Minimizing deterioration of evidence may also help to reduce the role of pre-
judice and other forms of systematic bias in the legal system. If abundant evidence
is available, the trier of fact has less need to resort to questionable assumptions about
human behavior that are based upon stereotypes, prejudices, or biases in an effort to
reach a decision, and reliance on such assumptions becomes both more difficult to
justify and easier to detect. 24 Reducing the role of prejudice and bias in decision-
making helps ensure the actual and apparent legitimacy of the decisions reached.
Not surprisingly, courts have not expressly used these rationales as a justification
for limitation of actions. There are, however, judicial indications that statutes of
limitation serve to protect courts and juries from having to make decisions based on
inadequate evidence.'25 While these judicial expressions may reflect an implicit con-
cern with preserving the appearance of justice, many appear to be concerned only
with the burden on the legal system of making such determinations. t26
The suggestion that the convenience of the legal system or the trier of fact is a
relevant consideration has been criticized. 27 One problem with such a rationale is
123. See Epstein, Past and Future Temporal Dimension, supra note 54, at 676.
124. See Bundy, supra note 80, at 429 ("Normally, for example, one would expect that rules which permit
a more complete and balanced factual record, such as discovery rules, would permit the drawing of finer distinctions
and make it more difficult for tribunals to justify discriminatory decisions.").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (explaining that statutes of limitation
"protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence") (emphasis added); Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 n.4
(1965). The Burnett Court stated:
Forasmuch as the Time of Limitation appointed for suing.., extend, and be so far and long Time past,
that it is above the Remembrance of any living Man, truly to try and know the perfect Certainty of such
Things, as hath or shall come in Trial ... to the great Danger of Mens Consciences that have or shall
be impanelled in any Jury for the Trial of the same ....
Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 n.4 (quoting The Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (Eng.)).
126. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) ("Statutes of limitation ... are
practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims .... ").
127. See United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1945). In Curtiss Aeroplane,
Judge Learned Hand stated:
It cannot be that statutes of limitations are in any degree for the purpose of relieving courts of the trial
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that it seems inconsistent with the approach of the legal system in general. Normally,
a court does not ask whether the quality of the evidence is sufficient for it to reach
a decision. Instead, cases are decided on the basis of whatever evidence the parties
present. As a result, many decisions are made on the basis of incomplete, flawed, or
otherwise unsatisfactory evidence. For example, if a suit is filed in a timely manner
but a key witness dies before his or her testimony is preserved, the legal system does
not simply abdicate its responsibility to resolve the claim. Although one side may
suffer more than the other, the case proceeds.'28 It is not clear why the approach
should differ just because the passage of time is involved, unless the conduct of one
side or the other caused the evidence to deteriorate. Perhaps the normal corrective
mechanisms, including the burden of proof, permitting adverse inferences to be
drawn from the intentional destruction of relevant evidence, or imposing tort liability
for the intentional destruction of evidence, are sufficient to address the problem, and
at a lower social cost than barring the plaintiff's claim.
C. Place Defendants and Plaintiffs on an Equal Footing
One of the most powerful policies supporting limitation of actions is the concern
that the passage of time will not only result in the deterioration of evidence, but that
it will also allow the plaintiff to gain an unfair advantage over the defendant. Many
cases have recognized that one of the purposes of a limitation system is to avoid
making it unreasonably difficult for defendants to answer the claims against them.' 29
Statutes of limitation serve this purpose by requiring timely notice to potential defen-
dants, 30 thereby giving both parties an equal opportunity to gather evidence while
of issues which have become hard to decide by loss of evidence. Courts are maintained to settle disputes
no matter how parties may embroil themselves; it would be a strange doctrine which forbade people to
deal with their affairs as they wished lest the judges become unduly vexed.
Id.
128. Distinguishing between bench and jury trials may be necessary in this context. A dearth of evidence may
make it more difficult for jurors to agree upon a verdict, and thus increase the likelihood of a mistrial.
129. See, e.g., Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 7 Cal. 4th 926,935, 873 P.2d 613,618,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
440,445 (1994) ("Such statutes [of limitation] ... mitigate the difficulties faced by defendants in defending stale
claims, where factual obscurity through the loss of time, memory or supporting documentation, may present unfair
handicaps."); Addison v. State, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317, 578 P.2d 941, 943, 146 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226 (1978) ("The
statutes [of limitation], accordingly, serve a distinct public purpose, preventing the assertion of demands which,
through the unexcused lapse of time, have been rendered difficult or impossible to defend.").
130. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345,352 (1983) ("Limitations periods are intended to
put defendants on notice of adverse claims... ").
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facts are still fresh.' "The theory is that even if one has a just claim, it is unjust not
to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation."'
32
This policy is not identical to the policy of avoiding the resolution of cases on
the basis of evidence which has deteriorated so badly that it no longer supplies an
adequate basis for adjudication. Instead, this policy rests on the premise that delay
usually works to the disadvantage of the defendant rather than the plaintiff because
the plaintiff can take steps to preserve evidence favorable to his or her case while
evidence that favors the defendant deteriorates. In an extreme situation, the plaintiff
conceivably could engage in "time shopping" and delay filing suit until the time that
is most advantageous for himself or herself and least advantageous for the defen-
dant.133 Permitting the plaintiff a one-sided option to delay before commencing suit
allows the plaintiff to speculate on the extent to which evidence will deteriorate, as
well as about whether that deterioration will adversely affect one side more than the
other.
A distinct basis underlying this purpose is the assumption that the cost of
mounting a defense is increased by the passage of time, regardless of whether a de-
fense on the merits is ultimately successful.l 34 Discovery can be made more expen-
sive by the cost of tracking down dispersed witnesses, searching for and retrieving
old documents, and reviving faded memories. Thus, by delaying the filing of a
lawsuit, the plaintiff may cause the defendant to incur an unnecessarily high level of
litigation costs.
The empirical basis for the premise that delay imposes greater disadvantages on
the defendant than on the plaintiff is, at best, uncertain. The premise rests on the
assumption that the plaintiff is aware of the existence of the potential claim but that
the defendant is not, and that the plaintiff is therefore responsible for the delay. There
may indeed be cases in which the defendant has little or no indication that he or she
131. See Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502,512,535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,712 (1975) ("The
fundamental purpose of such statutes [of limitation] is to protect potential defendants by affording them an oppor-
tunity to gather evidence while facts are still fresh.'); Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410,412, 525 P.2d 81, 83, 115
Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1974) ("[Ihe fundamental purpose of the limitations statute ... is to ensure timely notice to
an adverse party so that he can assemble a defense while the facts are still fresh."). As one opinion noted:
Once an action is filed and a defendant is served, he is then armed with notice of plaintiff's claim and
may protect his interests by means which were generally unavailable to him before filing. For example,
he may institute discovery processes in order to preserve evidence which might be destroyed, [or] may
locate material witnesses and take depositions if appropriate.
General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (Maraska), 65 Cal. 2d 88, 91, 416 P.2d 492, 494-95, 52 Cal. Rptr. 460,
462-63 (1966).
132. Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 898, 705 P.2d 886, 890, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317 (1985) (quoting
Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 (1977)).
133. See Berns v. Board of Supervisors, 315 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Va. 1984) ("Defendants could find themselves
at the mercy of unscrupulous plaintiffs, who hoard evidence that supports their position while waiting for their pro-
spective opponents to discard evidence that would help make a defense.").
134. Cf. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773,787,598 P.2d 45,53, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 400 (1979)
("Statutes of limitations have, as their general purpose, to provide repose and to protect persons against the burden
of having to defend against stale claims").
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did something wrong and, therefore, no reason to preserve or gather evidence when
it is available, while a plaintiff who suffered injury as a result of the wrong and does
not engage in hundreds or thousands of transactions of the same type may have a
better recollection of the circumstances and a greater incentive to preserve and gather
evidence before it deteriorates. But even when this assumption is true, the notion that
a plaintiff may lie in wait, secretly gathering evidence for years in order to obtain a
tactical advantage, seems fanciful.135 The possibility cannot be overlooked, however,
because California law gives the plaintiff up to three years after filing a complaint in
which to serve the defendant, 36 and permits the plaintiff to substitute new parties for
fictitiously named defendants within the three-year period, even though the party to
be added did not receive actual notice of the claims against it within the limitation
period. 137 Thus, the filing of a complaint in California does not necessarily ensure
that the defendant will promptly be placed on notice of the potential claims against
him or her.
Until recently, these provisions may have undermined the policy of placing
defendants on an equal footing by encouraging plaintiffs to engage in the type of
manipulation regarding the deterioration of evidence that the limitation system seeks
to avoid. The enactment of fast-track rules, however, has substantially eliminated the
problem by drastically reducing the time in which the plaintiff must serve the defen-
dant in routine cases. 38 While most fast-track rules permit an exception upon a
showing of good cause, 139 it is likely that outright manipulation occurs only in a
small percentage of cases that, although they may result in unfairness to a particular
defendant, may appropriately be disregarded for the purposes of establishing general
limitation policy.
140
In addition, there is no reason to assume that as a general rule plaintiffs will be
aware of potential claims but defendants will not. Either party or both may be aware
or unaware of the existence of a potential claim, and the equities of the situation
differ depending upon which permutation is considered.
135. It is conceivable, but also unlikely, that a plaintiff might delay for other reasons, such as to maximize
the amount of monetary relief awarded, if, for example, the statutory prejudgment interest rate exceeds the market
interest rate.
136. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.210 (West Supp. 1997) ("The summons and complaint shall be served
upon a defendant within three years after the action is commenced against the defendant.").
137. Id. § 474 (West 1979). See generally, James E. Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Practice:
A Fiction Stranger Than Truth, 30 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1977).
138. See, e.g., L.A. COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 7.7(a)(1) ("All complaints shall be served within 60 days of the
filing date....").
139. See, e.g., id.
140. Although it is likely that only a few defendants are affected directly, a much larger number may be
affected indirectly by changing their behavior to protect against the remote possibility that they may be ambushed
in this manner. For example, potential defendants may keep records or maintain insurance policies for excessively
long periods of time, to their detriment as well as the detriment of society. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying
text.
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If both parties are unaware of the existence of a potential claim (which may
occur, for example, when the harm caused by the wrong is latent), then neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant will realize that evidence should be preserved, and both
will be equally vulnerable to the deterioration of evidence through the passage of
time. Moreover, because the plaintiff usually bears the burden of proof on the
majority of issues, it seems more likely that, on balance, deterioration of evidence
would hurt the plaintiff more than it would hurt the defendant.
If, on the other hand, both parties are aware of the existence of a potential claim,
then both parties can act to preserve and gather evidence while the facts are still
fresh. Both parties also have an equal opportunity to initiate litigation, because if the
alleged wrongdoer is extremely concerned about the deterioration of evidence, he or
she may seek a declaratory judgment to ensure that the matter is resolved while the
evidence is still fresh. 4 Of course, a wrongdoer might be reluctant to pursue
declaratory relief for a variety of reasons. Among other considerations, commencing
an action for declaratory relief may force a victim who is otherwise disinclined to
pursue a potential claim to file a counterclaim. 42 Placing the victim in a position
where he or she has no alternative but to fight may overcome the victim's psycho-
logical reluctance to take formal action, thereby unleashing a claim that otherwise
might not have been asserted. If the victim were allowed an unlimited time to sue,
the wrongdoer would be faced with the unsavory choice of initiating litigation against
himself or herself or facing perpetual uncertainty. In this situation, therefore,
limitation of actions properly places the burden of going forward on the party seeking
to alter the status quo. The limitation period gives the plaintiff a reasonable time
within which to decide if the potential benefits of litigation outweigh its potential
costs, after which the possibility of litigation is foreclosed in order to promote the
other interests sought to be served by the limitation system. By reducing the need for
declaratory judgment actions, statutes of limitation may reduce the number of un-
necessary filings and prevent some small disputes from escalating into full-blown
litigation. This benefit may be offset by other factors, however, such as the number
of actions that are filed prematurely, before any significant injury has occurred, in
order to preserve the right to pursue a cause of action in the event of subsequent
harm.
Finally, the defendant may be aware of the existence of a potential claim while
the plaintiff is not. For example, a defendant may learn that a product is defective
before a particular plaintiff does because of the defendant's experience with previous
customers. Because the wrongdoer may take steps to preserve evidence, the prejudice
141. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1994); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West Supp. 1997).
142. See F. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (requiring the pleading of all counterclaims arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 426.30 (West 1973) (providing that related causes of action that
are not asserted are barred in a subsequent action). In California, the term "counterclaim" has been abolished, and
responsive pleadings seeking affirmative relief are referred to as "cross-complaints." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
428.80 (West 1973).
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he or she suffers by virtue of delay is diminished in this situation. The wrongdoer
also has a stronger motive to avoid filing a declaratory judgment action because the
wrongdoer will not want to alert the victim to the existence of a wrong of which the
victim is not aware, or which may never result in any cognizable harm to the victim.
It is questionable, however, whether society has an interest in protecting the
wrongdoer's ability to remain silent in the hope that his or her victim will not become
aware of the potential claim until after it is time-barred. In any case, it is clear that
the rationale underlying the policy of placing the defendant and the plaintiff on equal
footing is most persuasive when only the plaintiff is aware of the existence of a
potential claim.
The policy of placing plaintiffs and defendants on an equal footing has been
influential in shaping the limitation system. For example, some of the doctrines used
to toll the limitation period, such as equitable tolling 43 or relation back of amend-
ments,144 depend in part upon a showing that the plaintiff has in some effective man-
ner placed the defendant on notice of the claim, providing the defendant with a fair
opportunity to protect his or her interests by collecting relevant evidence shortly after
the events at issue. Conversely, if the defendant is aware that the plaintiff has a
potential claim, but the plaintiff is not, then often either the discovery rule of
accrual 45 or the doctrine of fraudulent concealment' 46 can be used to effectively toll
the limitation period until the plaintiff becomes aware of the potential claim.
The widespread adoption of the discovery rule of accrual has led to an increased
emphasis on this policy in recent years. Indeed, some courts have expressed the view
that since the principal purpose of statutes of limitation is to place the defendant on
143. The doctrine of equitable tolling tolls the limitation period of a civil action when the plaintiff's timely
commencement of a previous action or administrative proceeding is sufficient to place the defendant on notice of
a potential claim. See, e.g., Elkins, 12 Cal. 3d at 417-18, 525 P.2d at 86, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 646 ("Defendants' interest
in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence is fully
satisfied when prospective tort plaintiffs file [workers] compensation claims within one year of the date of their
injuries.").
144. The doctrine of relation back permits the plaintiffto amend the complaint to add claims or parties after
the limitation period has expired, if the initial complaint was sufficient to place the defendant on notice. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c). In California, however, relation back is permitted even if the defendant added by the
amendment was not placed on notice. For example, the California Supreme Court stated:
An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, and thus avoids the statute of limitations
as a bar against named parties substituted for fictional defendants, if it: (1) rests on the same general set
of facts as the original complaint; and (2) refers to the same accident and same injuries as the original
complaint.
Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 151, 702 P.2d 563, 565, 216 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (1985) (citing
Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 932, 936-37, 559 P.2d 624, 626-27, 136 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72
(1977)).
145. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 190,491 P.2d 421,430,98 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 846 (1971) (explaining that if the discovery rule applies, "the cause of action does not accrue until the
plaintiff knows, or should know, all material facts essential to show the elements of that cause of action").
146. See, e.g., Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 153 P.2d 325, 327 (1944) ("[W]hen the
defendant is guilty of fraudulent concealment of the cause of action the statute is deemed not to become operative
until the aggrieved party discovers the existence of the cause of action.").
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an equal footing with the plaintiff, the statute may be disregarded whenever the
defendant has actual notice of a potential claim. 47 This view, which appears to be
gaining broader acceptance, finds its clearest expression in Ateeq v. Najor,t48 in
which the court stated:
[W]hen a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets
up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct,
the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of the
opinion that a liberal rule should be applied. 49
The notion that notifying the defendant of the existence of a potential claim
should be treated as the equivalent of filing a complaint for purposes of limitation of
actions is problematic. For one thing, such an approach reduces clarity concerning
when the limitation period ceases to run. There is little room for debate about
whether a complaint has been filed, but the timing and adequacy of notice frequently
may be a matter of legitimate dispute. More fundamentally, this approach ignores the
other purposes of limitation of actions, such as promoting repose and accuracy in
fact-finding. 50 All that is accomplished by actual notice is placing the defendant and
the plaintiff on an equal footing with regard to the collection and preservation of
evidence. Although this is desirable, it should not necessarily be viewed as sufficient.
D. Promote Cultural Values of Diligence
Another important policy underlying limitation of actions is to encourage plain-
tiffs to diligently pursue their claims.'5 ' There is disagreement, however, concerning
the rationale for this policy. Some courts have suggested that this policy is merely a
147. See, e.g., Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 318, 578 P.2d at 943, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 226 ("[D]efendant can claim
no substantial prejudice, having received timely notice of possible tort liability upon filing of the compensation
claim, and having ample opportunity to gather defense evidence in the event a court action ultimately is filed.");
Elkins, 12 Cal. 3d at 412, 525 P.2d at 83, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 643 ("[T]he fundamental purpose of the limitations
statute... is to ensure timely notice to an adverse party so that he can assemble a defense while the facts are still
fresh. The filing of a compensation claim accomplishes this purpose and the tolling of the statute does not frustrate
it."); see also Crown, Cork & Seal, Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345,353 (1983) ("The defendant will be aware of the
need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all members of the class. Tolling the statute of
limitations thus creates no potential for unfair surprise.").
148. 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (1993).
149. Ateeq, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1356. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323 (quoting New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R.
Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340,346 (1922) (Holmes, J.)).
150. Another problem, of course, is that the court in Ateeq did not explain what it meant by the phrase "a
liberal rule:' It is unclear whether the court meant that the limitations rules should be disregarded entirely, or merely
that they should be applied in favor of the plaintiff in doubtful cases.
151. See, e.g., Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 7 Cal. 4th 926, 935, 873 P.2d 613, 617, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
440,445 (1994) ("Such statutes [of limitation] ensure that plaintiffs proceed diligently with their claims."); Jolly
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1112, 751 P.2d 923, 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1988) ("A second policy
underlying the statute [of limitation] is to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims.").
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means of implementing other policies underlying limitation of actions, such as
avoiding deterioration of evidence or promoting repose. 52 Indeed, one commentator
has argued that this is the only legitimate rationale for requiring plaintiffs to act
diligently:
This explanation for statutes of limitation can only be justified as an
instrument for furthering one or more of the purposes set forth above. Unless
the indolence of the plaintiff has somehow threatened the quality of the
evidence available at trial or intruded upon a potential defendant's repose,
no purpose, other than generally punishing the slothful, is served by barring
the claim. It would be curious indeed for a defendant to defend a contract
action by conceding that he had breached the contract, but asserting that the
plaintiff should not recover because she was a lazy slob.
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that limitation of actions also satisfies
certain psychological, cultural and moral imperatives. One such imperative is the
deeply ingrained notion that people should act promptly. This is expressed in the
equitable maxim: "Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights."'
It is also expressed in long-standing Christian religious beliefs that time is the
property of God and that it is a sin to waste time through delay or inefficiency.155 As
a society, we dislike procrastination and do not respect those who wait until the last
minute to do what could have been done earlier. This attitude is displayed in a variety
of popular sayings, such as "the early bird catches the worm" and "never put off until
tomorrow what you can do today."
t 56
Another such imperative is the idea that society should put the past behind and
move on with the future.157 At least in our Western culture, "[w]e do not easily
152. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 39 Cal. 3d 57, 62, 702 P.2d 197,
200, 216 Cal. Rptr. 115, 118 (1985) ("The purpose of any limitations statute is to require 'diligent prosecution of
known claims thereby providing necessary finality and predictability in legal affairs, and ensuring that claims will
be resolved while the evidence bearing on the issues is reasonably available and fresh."') (quoting Kaiser Found.
Hosp. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 329, 336, 562 P.2d 1037, 1040, 137 Cal. Rptr. 878, 881
(1977)); cf Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 (1977)
("Statutes of limitation ... are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared.") (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944))
(emphasis added).
153. Green, supra note 98, at 981.
154. 1 JOHNPOMEROY, ATREATISEONEQUTABLEJURSPRUDENCE § 418 (1918); cf CAL. Civ. CODE § 3527
(West 1970) ("The law helps the vigilant, before those who sleep on their rights.") (emphasis added).
155. See RtKIN. supra note 96, at 95-97.
156. See MICHAEL O'MALLEY, KEEPING WATCH 1-54 (1990).
157. See RIuXIN, supra note 96, at 185 ("Time being a premium, less and less is given over to making good
on prior promises and more and more is given over to facilitating new options and agreements."); Resnik, supra
note 89, at 85 (describing one of the policies favoring the finality of judicial decisions as a recognition that
"practically, both the system and the litigants must be able to turn attention and energies elsewhere").
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tolerate loose ends and are uncomfortable suspending an activity or an event in limbo
for long periods."'5 The future brings both problems and opportunities. If we are to
solve those problems and take advantage of those opportunities, it makes sense to
concentrate our attention on them, rather than dwelling on mistakes or wrongs that
happened long ago. This attitude is reflected in the popular sayings "let bygones be
bygones" and "there's no use crying over spilled milk."
Because it serves these cultural mores, the law of limitation of actions possesses
normative overtones.15 9 For this reason, we are less troubled about the loss of a claim
if the plaintiff has been lax in enforcing it. Our attitude is that "[i]f a man neglects
to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his
example."'' Some cases go so far as to suggest that the plaintiff should be punished
for his or her delay, and that the role of limitation of actions is to implement the
punishment by cutting off the plaintiffs ability to recover on a claim.16' The notion
of limitation of actions as punishment has enjoyed renewed favor in recent years, 62
so much so that one scholar has complained that "statutes of limitations are today
viewed as punitive, as opposed to protective. Their primary purpose is considered to
be punishment for the slumbering plaintiff and not protection for yesterday's
wrongdoer."'
163
It also can be argued that by punishing a few plaintiffs, the limitation system
benefits numerous others. Late filing has disadvantages for plaintiffs as well as for
defendants. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff waits ten or twenty years before
bringing suit. Unless the plaintiff has been lying in wait for the most advantageous
158. RwjKN, supra note 96, at 60; see EDwARDT. HALL, THE DANcE OFLIFE 32 (1983) ("We Americans are
driving to achieve what psychologists call 'closure,' Uncompleted tasks will not let go, they are somehow immoral,
wasteful, and threatening to the integrity of our social fabric.").
159. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) ("Limitations periods are
intended... to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.') (citation omitted); Kensinger v. Abbott Labs., 171
Cal. App. 3d 376, 384, 217 Cal. Rptr. 313, 318 (1985) ("The purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent
assertion of claims which have become stale due to plaintiff's neglect or inattentiveness."), disapproved in part on
other grounds, Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 751 P.2d 923,245 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1988).
160. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 476.
161. See, e.g., Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 165, 175, 180 P.2d 900, 906 (1947) (stating that
statutes of limitation "stimulate... activity and punish negligence") (quoting Wood, 101 U.S. at 139); accord Shain
v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. 402,406,38 P. 51,52 (1894); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales, 8 Cal. 3d 712, 721,
505 P.2d 213, 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. 21, 27 (1973) ("statutes of limitation only operate against those who, through
neglect or otherwise, fall to bring a timely claim.'); Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 228-29, 153 P.2d
325, 326 (1944) ("The statute of limitations.. . is intended to run against those who are neglectful of their rights,
and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement thereof.") (quoting I WOOD, supra note 17,
at 8-9).
162. See, e.g., Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1112,751 P.2d at 928,245 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (1988) ("Because a plaintiff
is under a duty to reasonably investigate.., those failing to act with reasonable dispatch will be barred.").
163. Nathan Kahan, Statutes of Limitations Problems in Cases of Insidious Diseases: The Development of
the Discovery Rule, 2 J. PROD. LLAs. 127, 136 (1978); cf. Holmes, supra note 1, at 477 ("It is only by way of reply
to the suggestion that you are disappointing the former owner, that you refer to his neglect having allowed the
gradual dissociation between himself and what he claims, and the gradual association of it with another.").
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time to sue-an unlikely prospect, at least in most cases'----the plaintiff's evidence
will have deteriorated to some extent and perhaps as badly as the defendant's. Since
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on most issues, any degradation in the quality
of evidence generally operates to the plaintiff's disadvantage.'65 In addition, the jury
may be suspicious of the merits of the plaintiff's claim because it remained un-
asserted for so long.' 66 The jury may take the delay to indicate either that the claim
has no merit, or that it is of such minimal importance that it is not worthy of serious
consideration. Finally, even if the plaintiff is successful, receipt of any recovery is
deferred, thereby reducing its value to the plaintiff.167 These factors operate to
weaken and reduce the value of the plaintiffs claim over time, regardless of the
limitation period.' 6 Assuming that plaintiffs, like most people, tend to procrastinate,
limitation of actions may benefit plaintiffs by giving them an incentive to sue while
their claims are still fresh and, therefore, at least marginally, more likely to succeed
or to yield a greater recovery.' 69 Although some plaintiffs lose their claims as a result
of the limitations bar, others are stimulated to seek redress promptly, to their
emotional 70 and financial benefit.
Promoting diligence and early filing, however, may have unintended negative
consequences. The impending expiration of the limitation period may cause a
plaintiff to file sooner than would be optimal. For example, a plaintiff may file an
action before any injury has occurred in order to preserve the plaintiff's rights in case
a contingent or speculative consequence of an alleged wrongdoing comes to pass.
Premature filing can also inhibit efforts at consensual resolution of disputes.',
If the purpose is to punish dilatory plaintiffs, moreover, limitation of actions is
a poorly chosen instrument. For every plaintiff denied just compensation for an
injury because he or she sued too late, there is a defendant who receives a windfall.
164. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
166. See Kelley, supra note 45, at 1645 ("jT]he late claimant's motives are suspect. Those impelled to redress
a felt wrong bring suit soon after the injury. The late claimant, by contrast, is likely to be motivated by malice or
simple greed rather than by a desire for justice.").
167. This is not always true. Delay alone may not always result in a net reduction in the value of the
plaintiff's claim. If prejudgment interest is available at a rate equal to or higher than the market rate, the value of
the judgment will be either unchanged or improved by the passage of time. In addition, the plaintiff's out-of-pocket
investment in litigation costs will be deferred. Thus, if litigation is postponed the plaintiff may earn a return on both
the potential judgment and the amount he or she would have invested in litigation costs. Other factors, however,
such as deterioration of evidence and concerns about collectibility of a favorable judgment, make this a dubious
strategy.
168. To the extent that these factors weaken the plaintiff's claim, they also undermine the implementation
of substantive law policy by making what would have been a successful claim unsuccessful or less successful. See
infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
169. See 1 CORMAN, supra note 53, § 1.1, at 13 ("'he plaintiff is induced not to neglect valid claims.").
170. Like defendants, plaintiffs also have an interest in "repose," in the sense that if one is aware of a claim,
he or she is likely to worry about the prospect of litigation and to speculate about how the claim will be resolved.
171. Of course, if such efforts appear promising to both parties, they can enter into an agreement to toll the
limitations period so that the necessity of filing does not disrupt their negotiations.
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A more efficient method of punishment would be to allow the dilatory plaintiff to
recover from the defendant, and then to confiscate the compensation awarded for the
public good, after the defendant had internalized the costs of his or her wrongful
conduct. Of course, if the plaintiff was aware in advance that his or her award would
be confiscated, the plaintiff would no longer have any incentive to sue. It might be
necessary, therefore, to limit any such confiscation to a portion of the plaintiff's
award.
The policy of encouraging diligence supports the plaintiff in cases in which there
is serious doubt regarding the plaintiff's awareness of the claim. In theory, it should
not matter why the statutory deadline was missed, unless the reason is one recog-
nized as a basis for tolling the limitation period. The rationale behind this policy,
however, suggests that the plaintiff must have had actual or constructive knowledge
of the existence of the potential claim before the plaintiff's claim should be barred.172
When the plaintiff lacks such knowledge, the statute of limitations provides no
incentive for diligence.
E. Encourage the Prompt Enforcement of Substantive Law
Arguably, "the central purpose of law is to guide behavior." 173 To the extent that
the enforcement of substantive law has a deterrent, rather than a compensatory, pur-
pose, prompt enforcement results in greater deterrence of wrongdoing for three
reasons. First, punishment closer in time to the offense is more effective in deterring
wrongdoing than delayed punishment, other things being equal. Second, any delay
in imposing sanctions allows the wrongdoer to commit additional wrongs before the
deterrent effect of punishment is felt. Third, the incremental value of deterrence
obtained by the pursuit of old claims is likely to be minimal. If the wrongdoer has not
continued his or her wrongdoing, then he or she has reformed and punishment will
not improve his or her conduct. If the wrongdoer has continued his or her wrong-
doing, then there are more recent wrongs for which he or she could more easily and
inexpensively be punished.174
The legal system relies heavily on the private enforcement of civil obligations
by the victims themselves. Consequently, statutes of limitation may help to promote
the deterrent effect of the substantive law by encouraging the prompt enforcement
of claims.175 This effect, however, must be balanced against the reduction in deter-
rence caused by limitation of actions. The deterrent effect of a substantive law rule
172. See, e.g., Kensinger, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 384,217 Cal. Rptr. at 318 ("Where the plaintiff is unaware
that her legal rights have been infringed, however, it would be palpably unjust to declare a cause of action
untimely.").
173. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. Rev. 425, 426-27 (1982)
[hereinafter Munzer, Retroactive Legislation].
174. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1, at 86 (1985).
175. See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868) ("The policy of these statutes
is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.").
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depends on the level of enforcement, the accuracy of adjudication, the severity of
punishment, and the promptness with which punishment is imposed. Although
encouraging the prompt enforcement of claims increases the level of deterrence by
increasing the present value of punishment of a given severity to the wrongdoer,
extinguishing valid claims decreases the level of enforcement or reduces the accuracy
of adjudication by increasing the probability that the wrongdoer will escape punish-
ment altogether. The net effect of these competing influences on deterrence is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to quantify.
Consideration of the effect of limitations rules on deterrence also requires
recognition that it is often sufficient simply to announce a substantive law rule to en-
sure that the overwhelming majority of persons and entities respect it. This is in part
because of widespread acceptance of our political institutions as providers of norms
governing behavior. On the other hand, it can be argued that the widespread com-
pliance with substantive law rules may be the product of a history of effective deter-
rence through civil litigation.
A related but slightly different point is that focusing attention and resources on
old cases hinders the ability of the common law to adjust rapidly to changing societal
conditions. As a result, the law changes less quickly than it should if resources are
to be allocated optimally in the long run.176 By encouraging the prompt enforcement
of the substantive law, limitation of actions may help society recognize and reassess
the impact of its laws in a more efficient manner.
F. Avoid Retrospective Application of Contemporary Standards
As time passes, circumstances change. During the past few decades, there have
been especially rapid changes in scientific knowledge and cultural values. 77 In less
than a century, for example, California has been transformed from a relatively un-
developed rural state to a densely populated, multi-cultural, highly complex industrial
power. Similarly, law changes and evolves with the passage of time. Conduct
accepted or even encouraged ten or twenty years ago is no longer tolerated today. If
the time of adjudication is too remote from the time at which the relevant events
occurred, then the standards against which the defendant's conduct is measured may
be substantially different than he or she could have anticipated. Statutes of limitation
may therefore serve, in part, to prevent the application of contemporary legal and
moral standards to conduct that occurred in the distant past.
The rationale underlying this policy is that it is unfair to retroactively judge past
behavior by present standards, at least when there has been a meaningful change in
176. See Posner, supra note 91, at 446 ("[Clourt delay increases error costs because the adaptation of legal
rules to altered circumstances is retarded....").
177. Cf ARNOLD TOYNBEE, EXPERiENCES 181 (1969) ("The pace has been accelerating constantly since the
earliest date from which any record of human affairs has survived.").
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those standards. 78 Although retroactive application of common-law rules is nor-
mal, 79 and not unconstitutional,W nevertheless there is something that strikes most
people as unfair about changing the legal consequences of conduct after the conduct
has occurred.'8' Among other things, it is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, for
judges and juries to put present-day standards out of their minds and to avoid second-
guessing the actions or omissions of others with the benefit of hindsight.
8 2
Measuring past conduct by contemporary standards also fails to promote deterrence
because "making liability depend on elements not known to the parties when they
choose their actions cannot affect their behavior.'
83
These concerns have not been offered by a California court as a justification for
limitation of actions. It is, however, well-established in California that "a change in
the law, either by statute or by case law, does not revive claims otherwise barred by
the statute of limitations."' 4 By refusing to hear cases that the statute of limitations
has barred, the courts implicitly recognize that it might be unfair to apply new rules
of law to circumstances that occurred long ago, even if they are willing to apply the
decision retroactively to cases that are still pending. Similarly, the retrospective
application of contemporary social attitudes to past conduct may fairly be included
within the scope of those circumstances that may render a claim "stale." Avoiding
178. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994) ("[The principle that the legal effect of
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and
universal human appeal.") (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494
U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHt. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982) ("In our zeal to punish abuses discovered
today, we must be cautious not to overlook the prevailing moral and business standards of the time involved.").
179. See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374-75 (1977).
180. See Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976) (rejecting due process challenge to
retroactive imposition of civil liability); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386, 390-91 (1798) (holding that the Ex
Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal prosecutions).
181. See EDMoND CAHN, THE MORAL DEctsON 253 (1955) ("me must not eccuse anyone of an act violating
some standard of behavior unless he [or she] could have ascertained the existence and meaning of the standard
before he [or she] committed the act"); Munzer, Retroactive Legislation, supra note 173, at 427 ("[Rletroactive
lawmaking violates what is often called the rule of law, namely, an entitlement of persons to guide their behavior
by impartial rules that are publicly fixed in advance."); Schwartz, supra note 65, at 818 ("[W]holly justified
expectations are not frustrated... as long as the liability rule to which the actor is subjected was at least somewhat
foreseeable at the time of his conduct.").
182. Cf. BERNARD BAILYN, ONTHETEACHING AND WRMNG OF HISTORY 55 (1994) (explaining that one of
the most difficult problems faced by a historian is that "you, as historian, as [distinct from the] participants, know
how it all came out").
183. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 80, at 198.
184. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1116, 751 P.2d 923, 931,245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 665 (1988); see
Monroe v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 6 Cal. 3d 399,406,491 P.2d 1105, 1109, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1971)
('he normal 'retroactivity' of most civil decisions has never been thought to supersede the operation of the statute
of limitations so as to revive old claims which were not pursued because of a previously prevailing contrary rule
of law."); Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 623, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (1978) ("lt is settled that the
retroactive operation of a judicial decision will not revive a cause of action previously barred by the statute of
limitations.").
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the litigation of "stale" claims is, of course, a frequently mentioned justification for
the barring of untimely claims.1
5
In assessing the weight this policy should receive, it is noteworthy that retro-
activity does not always disadvantage the defendant. Sometimes contemporary stan-
dards are more favorable to defendants than are past standards. In many ways,
society is less judgmental than it used to be, and it no longer condemns certain con-
duct that previously was a source of criminal or civil liability. 186
G. Reduce the Volume of Litigation
1. Reduce the Overall Number of Claims Filed
In this era of increasing court filings and shrinking government budgets, there
is a desire to reduce the volume of litigation that is processed through the legal
system. The limitations system is one mechanism that could be used to accomplish
this result.'8 7 Very short limitation periods could be expected to reduce the number
of lawsuits by deterring many of those who have missed the limitation period from
filing suit. This reduction would be partially offset by an increase in the number of
"protective" suits filed by plaintiffs who are unsure about the existence of a possible
claim and who want to make certain that their rights to present that possible claim in
the future are not lost by delay. On balance, though, the limitations system probably
does, and probably could be used even more extensively to, reduce the number of
lawsuits that are filed.
It is questionable, however, whether using statutes of limitation in this manner
is an effective way of reducing the overall volume of litigation. To start with, statutes
of limitation do not prevent untimely claims from being filed; they simply reduce the
incentive to file by providing a defense. The effectiveness of this defense in reducing
the number of untimely filings depends on the plaintiff's assessment of the futility
of pursuing the claim, which in turn depends on both the certainty and the severity
of the sanction. While the sanction is certainly severe (the defense of limitation, if
successful, completely bars the plaintiff's claim), there are currently so many
185. See, e.g., Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1112, 751 P.2d at 927-28, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63 (stating that "the
fundamental purpose of the statute [of limitations] is... to protect parties from defending stale claims"); Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 787, 592 P.2d 45, 53, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 400 (1979) (explaining that
"[s]tatutes of limitation have, as their general purpose, to provide repose and to protect persons against the burden
of having to defend against stale claims").
186. See MARY MIDGLEY, CAN'T WE MAKE MORAL JUDGEMENTS 3 (1993) (criticizing the presently
fashionable "duty of toleration," and arguing that society can and should make moral judgments).
187. Cf. Chase See. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). The court explained:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They
represent expedients. rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims .... They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.
Id.
495
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exceptions to limitation of actions that many prospective plaintiffs will be tempted
to file anyway. There is little or no sanction for filing an unsuccessful claim; indeed,
at least one court has held that because limitation of actions is an affirmative defense
that may be waived,188 a claim filed after the limitation period has expired cannot be
considered a frivolous claim. 89 Therefore, the only cost to the plaintiff is the time,
energy and money expended in pursuing a possibly untimely claim. These costs can
be substantial, but if the plaintiff is represented on a contingent fee basis, the
financial burden may be minimal.
Another consideration is that, given the complexity of existing limitation rules
and the manner in which they have evolved, it has become increasingly difficult to
dispose of time-barred claims as a threshold or preliminary matter (that is, by
demurrer or summary judgment) rather than at trial.'0 While this difficulty may
increase the cost to the plaintiff of pursuing an untimely claim, it also reduces the
probability that the defendant will prevail on a limitation defense, thereby increasing
the plaintiff's chance of recovery. This difficulty also means that the legal system
spends considerable time and resources in determining which claims are barred and
which are not. Consequently, any reduction in the overall quantity of litigation that
may be accomplished through the limitation system is likely to be small, and the net
resulting savings in judicial resources is likely to be modest.
Even more questionable is whether the desire to reduce the volume of claims
processed by the legal system has anything to do with limitation policy as such.
While reducing the number of claims is a potentially valid societal goal,' 9' it should
be pursued, if at all, by modifying the applicable substantive rules that facilitate or
encourage the pursuit of claims in the first place. If society believes that too many
lawsuits are being filed, consideration should be given to reducing the number of
wrongs that are actionable, erecting additional barriers to success (such as changing
the elements of claims or imposing higher burdens of proof), or reducing the reward
for prevailing (by capping damage awards, for example). Alternatively, the costs of
188. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576,581, 362 P.2d 473,476, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1965);
Brownrigg v. DeFrees, 196 Cal. 534,541,238 P. 714,716 (1925).
189. See Currie v. Schon, 704 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. La. 1989) ("Prescription will not barjudicial enforce-
ment of an obligation unless affirmatively pleaded by the defendant .... Hence, we would never impose sanctions
on a plaintiff who seeks to enforce an alleged extant right, albeit that enforcement may be barred if the defendant
chooses to plead prescription."). In civil law jurisdictions such as Louisiana, "statutes of prescription, like statutes
of limitations, bar the sought-for remedy and terminate access to the courts for enforcement of the existing right."
1 CORMAN, supra note 53, § 1.1, at 6; see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 752, 602 P.2d 393, 396, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 696 (1996) (holding that a successful statute of limitations defense "is not a favorable termination for
purposes of a subsequent malicious prosecution action").
190. See, e.g.,San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1325,44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 305, 308 (1995) ("The resolution of a statute of limitations defense is typically a factual question for the
trier of fact.').
191. In theory, reducing the amount of litigation would be beneficial to society because it would reduce the
quantity of resources expended on transactions that simply reallocate wealth, including both litigation costs and
liability insurance premiums, and therefore increase the quantity of resources available for the production of goods
and services.
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litigation might be increased. Filing fees could be raised, or the number of lawyers
could be reduced so that hiring an attorney to pursue a claim would become more
expensive. Marginal litigation could be discouraged by shifting responsibility for
payment of attorney's fees incurred by all parties to the losing side. Such measures
have their advantages and disadvantages, and are not necessarily desirable, but they
all possess the advantage of addressing the perceived problem directly, rather than
indirectly through the limitation system.
2. Reduce the Number of Unmeritorious Claims Filed
It has been suggested that one purpose of statutes of limitation is to help reduce
the number of unmeritorious' 92 or inconsequential claims 93 that are filed. This pur-
pose is based on the belief that long-delayed claims are more likely to be without
merit than promptly-filed claims. This belief, in turn, is based on the assumption that
a person possessing a well-founded claim and the ability to sue will file early to
obtain the expected redress as soon as possible.' 94
This rationale has intuitive appeal. It relies heavily on principles of self-selection:
presumably, the strongest and most sincerely held grievances will be presented first,
while the weaker and less-troubling claims will be prosecuted later. A lengthy delay
suggests that the matter is not a pressing one from the plaintiff's point of view, at
least when the plaintiff is aware of the existence of a potential claim. Moreover, one
who has delayed bringing suit is probably less likely to resort to self-help measures
if the claim is denied.
The lack of an empirical basis for this assumption, however, leaves it open to
question. It is arguable, for example, that unmeritorious claims may be relatively
more likely to be filed early, when anger and frustration, rather than reason, guide
192. An unmeritorious claim may be defined as a claim that ultimately will not prevail if adjudicated on the
merits.
193. See THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 157 (2d ed. Law. Co-op. Pub.
Co. 1936) (1929) (stating that the English Limitation Act of 1623 was intended in part to screen out inconsequential
claims).
194. See Barclay v. Blackington, 127 Cal. 189, 196, 50 P. 834, 836 (1899) (holding that "[s]tatutes of
limitations ... are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing it
beyond a reasonable time, if he has the power to sue") (quoting United States v. Wiley, 78 U.S. 508, 513-14
(1870)); accord Douglas v. Douglas, 103 Cal. App. 2d 29, 34-35, 228 P. 603, 606-07 (1951); see also Riddlesbarger
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868) (Statutes of limitation "are founded upon the general experience of
mankind that claims, which are valid, are not usually allowed to remain neglected. The lapse of years without any
attempt to enforce a demand creates, therefore, a presumption against its original validity, or that it has ceased to
subsist."); Seybold v. Magnolia Land Co., 376 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala. 1979) (same); I CORMAN, supra note 53,
§ 1.1, at 13 (stating that "[w]hen no attempt is made in a reasonable time to enforce a demand, it is likely that a
judicial presumption will arise against the original validity of the claim or its continued existence"); Green, supra
note 98, at 1003 n.164 (explaining that "[t~he assumption underlying this claim is that those with meritorious claims
will be anxious to pursue them and will therefore file suit promptly"); id. at 989-91 n.113 (describing the
"traditional" conception that the percentage of meritorious cases decreases over time).
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decisionmaking. 195. Later, when cost and benefit considerations may be more
dispassionately assessed, an unmeritorious claim may be relatively less likely to be
asserted.
In addition, failure to pursue a claim promptly does not necessarily mean that the
claim is without merit. Other explanations are plausible. First, the plaintiff may have
suffered from some incapacity, less serious than those recognized as grounds for
tolling the limitation period, that rendered prompt pursuit of the claim difficult or
unattractive. For example, a meritorious claim may have been temporarily ignored
because of other, more pressing issues, such as a death in the family or the loss of a
job. Second, the plaintiff may have been unsure of or mistaken about the actual
circumstances, such as incorrectly believing that the defendant's conduct was not
wrongful, incorrectly attributing the harm to a cause other than defendant's wrong-
doing, or incorrectly believing that the harm caused was far less serious than it
actually was. Third, the plaintiff may have been intimidated by the prospect of parti-
cipating in the legal process. For example, the plaintiff might have been concerned
with the risk of counterclaims or liability for the defendant's costs or fees, or may
simply have feared that litigation would be an emotional ordeal. Fourth, the plaintiff
may have been ignorant of the applicable limitation rules and, as a result, may not
have consulted counsel promptly. Fifth, the plaintiff may have been unable to afford
a lawyer, or unable to find a lawyer who would accept the claim on a contingent-fee
basis, for a substantial period of time. Sixth, the plaintiff may have received poor
advice from counsel or others. Seventh, the plaintiff may have believed that the
defendant was insolvent and that pursuing the claim would not be worth the effort,
and may have filed suit only after learning that his or her assessment of the defen-
dant's solvency was incorrect, or that the defendant's financial condition has im-
proved in the interim. Eighth, the plaintiff may have received assurances that the
defendant would correct the problem without formal action, or may have elected to
pursue the possibility of a prefiling settlement.
None of these' circumstances indicate that the plaintiff currently lacks a belief
that he or she has a valid claim against the defendant. In addition, there are already
financial disincentives to pursuing plainly unmeritorious claims. Since the plaintiff
must pay his or her costs and attorney's fees, or an attorney must agree to take the
case on a contingent-fee basis, the number of plainly unmeritorious claims that
plaintiffs pursue should be small. These disincentives may not work properly if there
is an oversupply of attorneys, if the plaintiff misleads counsel about the circum-
stances of his or her claim, if the plaintiff is not required to internalize some of the
costs of pursuing an unsuccessful claim, 196 or if there is a structural imbalance, such
195. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. I. at 86 (1985) (noting that the desire for revenge or retribution
wanes with the passage of time).
196. A plaintiff who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se may not internalize the costs of
pursuing or losing a lawsuit to a sufficient degree to experience any disincentive for filing unmeritorious claims,
Soine so-called vexatious litigants fall into this category.
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as the one that some have argued exists in the context of federal securities liti-
gation.' 97 Even in these circumstances, however, there is no reason to assume that the
percentage of unmeritorious claims is greater for long-delayed claims than for
timely-filed ones. Perhaps for this reason, some courts have rejected this policy as
a justification for limitation of actions. 198
3. Reduce the Number of Disfavored Claims Filed
One way to discourage or prevent people from filing certain types of claims is
to shorten the limitations period so that more claims will be forfeited inadvertently.
Thus, in some cases, a short limitation period may simply indicate a political or legis-
lative hostility to certain types of claims. For example, in 1905 the California Legis-
lature shortened the period for wrongful death and personal injury claims from two
years to one year. 199 It is probable that this change was made in response to a large
increase in the number of such claims as a result of the increasing mechanization of
industry following the Industrial Revolution.
This seems a dubious purpose to be pursued through a limitation system. If cer-
tain claims are disfavored, then the substantive law should be changed either to
restrict their availability, or to eliminate them altogether. If pursued overtly, however,
such changes might be politically unpopular or provoke controversy or outrage. An
amendment to the relevant statute of limitation, by contrast, is usually less likely to
provoke notice or debate. It is therefore probable that limitation of actions is
sometimes used to achieve indirectly what could not be achieved directly.
Statutes of limitation may also be used to reduce the number of claims filed
against certain classes of defendants who, because of special need or legislative clout,
are able to obtain special protection for themselves. For example, protection of poor
defendants is said to be one of the policies on which the English Limitation Act of
1623 was based.2 This specific purpose has long been abandoned, but contemporary
statutes of limitation include special provisions protecting those involved in con-
structing improvements to real property,20' as well as certain professionals, such as
physiciansm and lawyers. 203 While differing limitation periods for certain types of
cases may be justified in some instances, there is the lingering suspicion that some
197. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
198. See, e.g., McCarthy v. White, 21 Cal. 495, 503 (1863) ("It was formerly held that statutes of this nature
proceeded upon a presumption of payment .... This view is now exploded, and the statute is universally regarded
as one of repose.").
199. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 258, sec. 2, at 231-32 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3)).
200. PLUCKNETr, supra note 193, at 157; see A'Court v. Cross, 130 Eng. Rep. 540, 541-42 (K.B. 1825)
("Christianity forbids us to attempt enforcing the payment of a debt which time and misfortune have rendered the
debtor unable to discharge.").
201. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982).
202. See id. § 340.5 (West 1982).
203. See id. § 340.6 (West 1982).
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of the existing classifications are the product of political favoritism rather than
rational distinctions made on the basis of empirical evidence.
IV. POLICIES DISFAVORING LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. Promote Adjudication of Claims upon Their Substantive Merits
The principal purpose disfavoring limitation of actions is "the 'strong public
policy' that seeks to dispose of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural
grounds." 4 This objective has been most clearly expressed in the analogous context
of dismissals for failure to prosecute.2°5 In such cases, the California Supreme Court
has frequently stated that "[it is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible,
a hearing on the merits." 20 Likewise, the legislature has recognized the importance
of this policy:
Except as otherwise provided by statute or by rule of court adopted pursuant
to statute .... the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the
merits ... [is] generally to be preferred over the policy that requires
dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution
of an action ....
Because statutes of limitation serve many of the same purposes as statutes governing
dismissals for failure to prosecute, 20 8 the same policy has also been recognized in
cases involving statutes of limitation. It may carry slightly less weight in the
204. Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 152,702 P.2d 563,566,216 Cal. Rptr. 405,408 (1985)
(citation omitted).
205. see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 583.110-.430 (West Supp. 1997). These sections contain the substance
of former §§ 581a and 583. See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1705, sec. 5, at 6176 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
583.110-.430).
206. Shamblin v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 478, 749 P.2d 339, 341,243 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905 (1988); accord
Weitz v. Yankosky, 63 Cal. 2d 849, 854,409 P.2d 700,704, 48 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1966); Waybright v. Anderson,
200 Cal. 374, 377, 253 P. 148, 149 (1927); see Lyons v. Wickhorst, 42 Cal. 3d 911,916, 727 P.2d 1019, 1021, 231
Cal. Rptr. 738,740 (1986) ("The courts have long recognized a policy favoring a trial on the merits."); Hocharian
v. Superior Court (Perez), 28 Cal. 3d 714, 724, 621 P.2d 829, 831, 170 Cal. Rptr. 790, 795 (1981) ("The court must
also keep in mind the strong public policy that litigation be disposed of on the merits wherever possible."); Berri
v. Rogero, 168 Cal. 736, 740, 145 P. 95, 97 (1914) ("The policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon
its merits.").
207. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.130 (West Supp. 1997).
208. See, e.g., Barrington, 39 Cal. 3d at 152, 702 P.2d at 566, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 408 ("Both [former] section
581a and the statute of limitations were designed to move suits expeditiously toward trial."); General Motors Corp.
v. Superior Court (Maraska), 65 Cal. 2d 88, 91,416 P.2d 492, 494, 52 Cal. Rptr. 460,462 (1966) ( "The purposes
served by this section are somewhat analogous to those underlying statutes of limitation.").
209. See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111,751 P.2d 923, 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662
(1988) (reasoning that "[tihe foregoing is fully consistent with the policy of deciding cases on the merits as well
as the policies underlying the statute of limitations"); Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, 38 Cal. 3d 46, 56-57,
694 P.2d 1153, 1158, 210 Cal. Rptr. 781,786 (1985) (noting the "strong public policy that litigation be disposed
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context of limitation of actions, however, because after the complaint is filed and
served, the defendant can take steps to protect himself or herself from some of the
consequences of the passage of time.210
There are several reasons for valuing the adjudication of claims, whether valid
or invalid, on their merits. First, the fundamental reason for having a legal system is
to resolve disputes on their merits under the substantive law.211 Procedural rules are
necessary to maintain order and to promote efficiency within the legal system.
However necessary such rules may be, they are not the legal system's reason for
being. Rather, they are subordinate to the more fundamental purposes of the substan-
tive law.212 Consequently, deciding an issue on some ground other than the
substantive merits seems to miss the point. "No one ... feels satisfied when a
decision announced is based on what seems to be a legal technicality instead of on
the real issue.
' 213
A second reason for valuing adjudication of even unmeritorious claims on their
merits is that doing so comports with fundamental notions of fairness and due
process of law. 214 "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury."215 Thus, "on any scale, the barrier to any hearing at all seems a more drastic
imposition on justice than potential harm to the quality of the fact-finding process
once in court."
216
Third, allowing all litigants their "day in court" promotes the dignitary value of
the legal process. It is frustrating and demeaning not to be allowed to be heard when
-of on the merits wherever possible") (quoting Hocharian v. Superior Court (Perez), 28 Cal. 3d 724, 621 P.2d 829,
834, 170 Cal. Rptr. 790,795 (1981)).
210. See General Motors Corp., 65 Cal. 2d at 91,416 P.2d at 494, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 462 ("[Former] section
583 would appear to involve policy considerations somewhat less crucial than those safeguarded by statutes of
limitation.").
211. Cf. JAMES ET AL., supra note 61, § 1.1, at 2 ("In its day-to-day application, the law of procedure
implements substantive law.").
212. See Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 420, 525 P.2d 81, 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641, 648 (1974) ("A
procedural practice is neither sacred nor immutable. It must be able to withstand the charge that it is inequitable,
burdensome or dysfunctional."); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938)
(stating that "the relation of rules of practice to the work ofjustice is intended to be that of a handmaid rather than
a mistress") (quoting In re Coles, 1 K.B. 1, 4 (1907)).
213. SOLAN, supra note 20, at 27; see RoBERT E. KEEMON. JUDGING 99 (1990) (noting that decisionmakers
prefer to make decisions "squarely on [the] substantive merits").
214. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ("If the underlying facts or circumstances relied
upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his [or her] claim
on the merits."); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ("The due process clause requires that every man
shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it con-
demns .... "); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard."); Addison v. State, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 320-21,578 P.2d 941,945, 146 Cal. Rptr. 224,
228 (1978) (noting that "the policy of the law of this state... favors avoiding forfeitures and allowing good faith
litigants their day in court"); JAMES Er AL, supra note 61, § 6.7. at 311 ("Another characteristic American value
is the right to have one's say, specifically, to have one's 'day in court.").
215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
216. O'Neal, supra note 23, at 119.
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a person believes that he or she possesses a valid complaint. Creating such feelings
of frustration and powerlessness causes disaffection with the legal system, and
possibly with the political system as well. As one commentator has argued:
[N]o democratic political theory can ignore the sense of injustice that
smolders in the psyche of the victim of injustice. If democracy means
anything morally, it signifies that the lives of all citizens matter, and that
their sense of their rights must prevail. Everyone deserves a hearing at the
very least ... 27
On this view, "the trial is an end in itself in the same way that religious rituals and
artistic performances are not means to ulterior purposes but are intrinsically
valuable."2 8
The consequences of impairing the dignitary value of participation in the legal
process may not be equally distributed. "The legal assertion of a claim is a political
event, sometimes a significant one, even if the claim is rejected. In our tradition it is
thus a function in fact if not in concept for the courts to be forums for political
grievance."219 As one scholar has noted:
The fact that courts make policy conditions the political process in the
United States. It opens another avenue for seeking favorable decisions for
those who are unsuccessful with the legislature or the executive. If a group
fails to capture or hold a legislative majority, and if it fails to elect its man
as chief executive of the state or nation, it may nevertheless seek to alter
public policy through litigation
For this reason, being deprived of the ability to have a claim heard on its merits may
be particularly damaging and painful for the underprivileged or the unpopular, just
217. JUDn'H N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 35 (1990).
218. William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. REV. 29, 93; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITrUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that there
is "intrinsic value in the due process right to be heard" because "[w]hatever its outcome, such a hearing represents
a valued human interaction in which the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the
decision that vitally concerns her"); Resnik, supra note 89, at 854 ("The state confirms individuals' worth by
employing its ritual in response to claims of wrongdoing.").
219. Geoffrey C. Hazzard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CH. L. RE V. 699, 711 (1969); see
Morris B. Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REv. 247, 259 (1972) ("Both voting and access to the
courts are forms of enfranchisement, of participation in the political process.").
220. HERERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 41 (3d ed. 1978); see Thomas E. Willging, Financial Barriers
and the Access ofIndigents to the Courts, 57 GEO. LJ. 253, 281 (1968) ("For minorities or the disenfranchised,
litigation may provide the sole opportunity to influence policy.").
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as some have argued that exclusion from jury service is more painful and alienating
for those in the minority than for those in the majority22! '
Fourth, there is a societal interest in promoting the resolution of disputes through
officially sanctioned mechanisms and in avoiding recourse to violence.m2 The legal
system exists in part to channel disputes into a resolution system regulated by the
government, thereby minimizing the desire that disputants might otherwise feel to
resort to unauthorized private remedies such as self-help. Allowing people who
believe that they have been wronged an opportunity to be formally heard is a way of
lessening the impulse toward violence. It gives them a chance to vent their anger and
frustration before an audience that is at least willing to hear their side of the story,
even if it is not actually persuaded by what they have said. "Just as the members of
a club will stop paying dues when the benefits of membership cease, so plaintiffs will
be tempted to stop paying the 'dues' of [their] obedience when society refuses to
provide the 'membership benefits' of protection of their fundamental rights.' 2
Finally, the availability of a court is comforting and reassuring.
Some dim awareness that courts are available as a last resort to protect one's
entitlements, including, to some extent, one's claim to fair and just treat-
ment, must certainly in our society in its present stage of evolution, make a
significant contribution to whatever sense of security people feel in entering
into relationships with others-relationships often involving personal ex-
posure or dependency of one sort or another.... [By contrast,] suspicion
that certain others cannot count upon effective judicial access can hardly
help biasing the shape of transactions, relationships, and attitudes that arise
between oneself and... others.224
For example, if a manufacturer understands that its customers will not learn of latent
defects early enough to sue, the manufacturer might be less than optimally en-
couraged to conduct adequate research into the long-term consequences of such
defects.
At first glance, limitation of actions would seem to be fundamentally at odds
with the policy favoring adjudication of claims on their merits. By denying parties
221. Edward A. Villalobos, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican American, 5 LOY. U. L. REV. 87,
121-22 (1972).
222. See, e.g., Weeks v. Roberts, 68 Cal. 2d 802, 806, 442 P.2d 361, 364, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (1968)
("[C]ourts exist primarily to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties. Over
a long and bitter history this peaceful method of adjudication has replaced other and primitive, and indeed physical,
means of resolution"') (quoting Vecki v. Sorenson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393, 340 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1959)
(citation omitted)).
223. Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1683, 1690 n.31 (1983); see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTicE 261 (1971) ("A just system must generate
its own support... [and] an effective desire to act in accordance with its rules for reasons of justice.").
224. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights-Part I, 1974 DuKE L.. 527, 536, 537.
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recourse to the legal system for resolution of their claims, limitation of actions could
increase societal disaffection with government and with the legal system, at least to
some extent. On the other hand, if the legal system produces inaccurate results or
outcomes that approximate random dispositions, it may sacrifice some of its
legitimacy and attractiveness, thereby encouraging some to attempt to resolve their
disputes outside of the legal system. As one group of scholars has concluded:
The civil judicial system is passive in the sense that it operates only on the
initiative of one of the parties. And it can be effective only so long as most
people seek resolution of their disputes within the system. As soon as resort
is had to different techniques, the ability of the courts to operate as a viable
force is dispelled. Reliance on the system will only be reality so long as the
courts' ability to resolve disputes expeditiously is respected, and the results
reached are highly regarded.m
By attempting to ensure accuracy in adjudication, limitation of actions helps to
preserve the legal system as a reliable and objective means for resolving disputes.
It is important to remember, however, that litigation is not always the best way
to solve societal problems (although at this time in our history it may be the most
familiar way). Depending upon the form it takes, alternative dispute resolution may
be better for litigants and the legal system than litigation. Negotiated settlements
sometimes result in outcomes that are better for both parties than a decision the legal
system could achieve, although both mediation and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, such as arbitration, may be structured in ways that favor certain interests
at the expense of others.2 26 Similarly, a rise in the incidence of self-help is not neces-
sarily a bad thing, depending upon the manner in which it is manifested. Consumer
boycotts and negative publicity campaigns are neither less effective nor less desirable
simply because they are extrajudicial. Such measures possess deterrent effect,
educate others, and may help to prevent future harm, although they rarely result in
compensation to those already injured. Consequently, in assessing the impact of
limitation of actions on social welfare, care should be taken not to overestimate the
importance of traditional litigation as a means of resolving disputes or accomplishing
socially desirable objectives.
225. William H. Levit et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916,924 (1971).
226. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1358 (1994) ("In both adjudication and mediation, minorities received less
when they were claimants and paid more when they were respondents compared to nonminority parties. This
disparity was more extreme in cases that were mediated.") (citations omitted). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
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B. Vindicate Meritorious Claims
Another policy disfavoring limitation of actions is the desire to vindicate
meritorious claims. The desire to provide redress for a perceived injustice is
instinctive and powerful. 227 People need to receive just treatment and to ensure that
just treatment is received by others. This desire is expressed in the legal maxim "[flor
every wrong there is a remedy." '
The loss of a valid claim violates our sense of justice for at least four reasons.
First, the loss of a valid claim imposes a substantial cost on the plaintiff. A plaintiff
whose claim is barred will not obtain redress for his or her injury through the legal
system. Sometimes this means that the plaintiff's loss will not be compensated at all.
"Failure to provide compensation where morally it is held due" is a form of
injustice.2 9 Indeed, injustice may be defined, in part, as "the refusal to recognize
valid claims." 30
Second, barring a claim as untimely deprives the plaintiff of the satisfaction of
vengeance. Although we tend to regard it principally as a concern of the criminal
law, retribution is one form of justice.' 3t However much we like to believe that we
have progressed beyond the primitive desire for revenge, there is no denying that it
forms part of the motivation for the filing of some civil lawsuits.
Third, the passage of time, by itself, seems irrelevant to the just resolution of a
claim. Even courts have conceded that statutes of limitation "are by definition
arbitrary." 232 As we have seen, there are various reasons why the passage of time may
be relevant as a practical matter, although not all of the practical concerns point in
the same direction. Putting practical concerns aside, however, the passage of time
would appear to have little, if anything, to do with whether a plaintiff deserves
compensation, whether a defendant deserves punishment, or whether potential
wrongdoers require deterrence. On these questions, time is neutral; its passage does
not affect the moral standing of either party unless the plaintiff has not been diligent
and the defendant has been prejudiced. The hierarchy of cultural values expressed in
227. See EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 24-25 (1949) (stating that "the human animal is
predisposed to fight injustice"); ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 147 (1987) ("[I]njustice is
intolerable and therefore must be answered."); id. at 162 ("It is ... not tolerable or acceptable that the innocent
should suffer and the wicked not pay for their misdeeds.").
228. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (West 1970).
229. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 160 (1961); see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and
Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439,450 (1990) (arguing that if the law is to satisfy the require-
ments of corrective justice, "victims must be made whole (compensated)").
230. SHKLAR, supra note 217, at 18-19.
231. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHiL. REv. 3. 4-5 (1955) ("The state of affairs where the
wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and it is better
irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.'); see also Leviticus 24:17-22 ("And if a man cause a
blemish in his neighbor, as he hath done, so shall it be done to him: breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth;
as he hath cause a blemish in a man, so shall it be rendered unto him.').
232. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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the equitable maxim qui prior est tempore, potier estjure, that is, "where there are
equal equities, the first in time shall prevail,"3 3 suggests that temporal considerations
are a disfavored basis for the allocation of rights, because time should be the deciding
factor only when the claims of the parties are otherwise equally just.
Fourth, the loss of a valid claim on the ground of limitation of actions (or on any
other procedural ground) impairs the implementation of substantive law policy. It
results in the underenforcement of the substantive law by allowing some wrongdoers
to escape liability for reasons unrelated to the objectives of the substantive law. Not
only will some wrongdoers fail to receive their "just deserts," but they will also be
underdeterred from future wrongdoing because they were not required to compensate
their victims for the harm caused and to suffer the punishment of civil liability.
Others who are instructed by their examples will also be less than optimally deterred
from violating the substantive law rules. As a consequence, the substantive law rules
will be followed less often than they would have been had the victims' claims not
been barred by the limitation system. This, in turn, means that socially destructive
conduct may not be adequately discouraged.
This view, however, fails to recognize that there are also social costs if a
limitation period does not bar a long-delayed claim. From a purely economic point
of view, the statute of limitations should bar a claim only when the sum of all costs
incurred if the claim is not barred (including the risk of inaccurate adjudication, the
costs of record-keeping and insurance premiums, the psychological harm to potential
defendants, the disruption of the reliance interests of nonparties, and the like)
outweigh the sum of all costs of not implementing the substantive law in what is
probably a relatively small subset of cases. If this cost-benefit analysis has been
properly calibrated, then the loss of a valid claim is an unfortunate, but necessary,
consequence of a trade-off that has been made to maximize social welfare?'
Moreover, there are several reasons why limitation of actions ought to be applied
in the same fashion to both apparently valid and apparently invalid claims, regardless
of whether the policy of the substantive law will be frustrated by implementation of
the limitations bar. First, to apply limitations law differently depending upon the
merits of a claim would violate one of the central tenets of the limitation system: that
the defendant should not be required to prove the lack of merit of the plaintiff s claim
because the plaintiff s delay in filing the claim may have impaired the defendant's
ability to do so.2 5 In other words, if the merits are to be considered in determining
233. 1 POMEROY, supra note 154, at § 414.
234. See Gentile v. Alermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 21 (Conn. 1975) ("Individual rights and remedies must at times
and of necessity give way to the interests and needs of society.").
235. Cf. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1997).
When the answer pleads that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.... or sets up any other
defense not involving the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action but constituting a bar or ground of
abatement to the prosecution thereof, the court may, either upon its own motion or upon the motion of
any party, proceed to the trial of the special defense or defenses before the trial of any other issue in the
case ....
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whether the action is time-barred, the defendant would be subjected to the very
prejudice that limitation of actions is designed to avoid. The result is circular and
self-defeating, provided that one accepts the notion that the limitation system should
exist at all.
Second, if courts are to avoid subjecting every defendant with a colorable statute
of limitations defense to a full trial on the merits, some preliminary assessment of the
merits would have to be made. Even when the claim is timely, however, a pre-
liminary inquiry into the merits may be both unreliable and prejudicial to the
defendant. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,'236 for example, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the use of a preliminary assessment of the merits in deter-
mining whether to certify a class action, saying:
[A] preliminary determination of the merits may result in substantial
prejudice to a defendant, since of necessity it is not accompanied by the
traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials. The court's
tentative findings, made in the absence of established safeguards, may color
the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant.
37
When limitation of actions is an issue, the risk of unfairness is even greater. The pre-
liminary determination of the merits may have to be made on the basis of evidence
that has deteriorated, making it potentially even more unreliable than preliminary
assessments of the merits in other situations. In addition, making such preliminary
determinations would be inefficient. Courts would be required to determine the
merits twice: once to decide if the claim is time-barred, and again to decide whether
the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
A third reason why limitation of actions ought to be applied in the same manner
to both meritorious and unmeritorious claims is that the very existence of the
limitation system presumes that some meritorious claims will be barred.238 In
practical terms, a limitation system that barred only unmeritorious claims would be
Id. (emphasis added).
236. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
237. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. But see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978)
("Evaluation of many of the questions entering into determination of class action questions is intimately involved
with the merits of the claims."); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knellfor Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 369 (1996) (arguing that courts should be permitted
to consider the merits in determining whether to certify class actions for monetary relief).
238. See California Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 127 Cal. 107,111,59 P. 292,293 (1899) ("It is important
to keep clearly in mind the double aspect of statutes of limitations-First, as an obstacle to just claims; and
secondly, as an aid to just defenses which have been rendered uncertain by the moldering effects of time")
(emphasis added); see also Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 ("Statutes of limitation ... are by definition arbitrary,
and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim."); Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S.
231, 236 (1887) ('The statute of limitations was not enacted to protect persons from claims fictitious in their origin,
but from ancient claims, whether well or ill founded, which may have been discharged, but the evidence of
discharge may be lost.").
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redundant, barring only those claims that could be successfully, although perhaps not
always easily, defeated on substantive law grounds. The only difference resulting
from adding the complexity of limitations would be another issue to be litigated and
the possibility that a limitations defense would sometimes enable a defendant to
defeat a claim against him or her without a trial on the merits. That possibility,
however, has been eroded in recent years by the widespread adoption of discovery-
based accrual, 9since the time of discovery is usually a question of fact. 24°If the
courts were to consider the merits in resolving the limitation issue, the ability to
resolve the issue early in the litigation, on demurrer or on a motion for summary
judgment, would be further reduced.
In theory, the substantive law and limitation of actions could overlap sub-
stantially without either system being deprived of all of its value. Suppose, for
example, that a relatively higher percentage of untimely claims are unmeritorious,
or that the limitation system provides an extremely effective incentive that en-
courages the timely filing of nearly all meritorious claims. Under these conditions,
although the outcome of most cases would be the same, the number of claims
actually litigated might be smaller if the limitation system was retained. In addition,
the limitation system might be viewed as a type of safeguard, a second method of
screening out unmeritorious claims (a few of which will prevail if litigated, because
no system of determining the merits is error-free). However, as we have seen, the
failure to pursue a claim promptly does not necessarily mean that the claim is without
merit, and the addition of a complex system of limitations does not appear to be a
very reliable or cost-effective way of correcting the errors inherent in the application
of the substantive law.
One of the factors that makes the policy of adjudicating claims on the merits such
a powerful countervailing force to the policies favoring limitation of actions is the
tendency of the courts to focus upon the meritorious claims that the limitation period
bars-rather than all barred claims, some of which are presumably not valid-in
evaluating the functioning of the limitation system in a particular case. What
accounts for this tendency? Perhaps it is assumed that if the claim were
unmeritorious (at least in the sense that it had no realistic hope of succeeding), the
plaintiff (or the attorney handling the case on a contingent-fee basis) would not
bother pursuing the claim. In addition, one or more elements of the claim, or the fact
that the plaintiff has suffered some loss, may be indisputable on the evidence that has
been preserved. This generates sympathy for the plaintiff, especially when he or she
239. See Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502. 512, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,712 (1975) ("Our
law has evolved... to a point where the limitations clock only begins to run on certain causes of action when the
injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts supporting liability.").
240. Cf. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1112,751 P.2d 923,928,245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1988)
(holding that "resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact"); San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1325,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305,308 (1995) ("The resolution
of a statute of limitations defense is typically a factual question for the trier of fact.").
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appears to be innocent of carelessness or wrongdoing. A defendant against whom
there is at least some evidence seems a worthy candidate for setting matters right.
It is apparent from the language of judicial opinions that in deciding limitation
of action issues, courts are sometimes influenced by indications that the plaintiff's
claim has merit.24t As a result, it is customary for the plaintiff to present the merits
of the claim in the strongest possible light when limitation issues arise in the course
of litigation. The plaintiff hopes to persuade the court that what is being lost is not
merely the right to adjudicate a claim that may or may not be valid, but the loss of
a valid claim. To respond to this tactic effectively, the defendant is forced to demon-
strate that the claim is without merit by showing that his or her conduct was not
blameworthy, that the plaintiff was at fault, or that the loss suffered was not severe.
This places the defendant in the unfortunate position of defending against the claim
on the merits in the course of litigating a limitations issue, even though one of the
principal purposes of limitations law is to avoid forcing defendants to defend them-
selves when the evidence concerning the claim has deteriorated.
Although many judges and some juries may be sufficiently disciplined in their
decisionmaking to avoid this problem, this consequence may be unavoidable to some
extent.242 The fact of the matter is that we do regret the loss of some claims (namely
meritorious ones) more than we regret the loss of others. 243 If a meritorious claim is
barred, everyone but the defendant loses. The plaintiff is unable to obtain compen-
sation for his or her injury, and society is damaged by the failure to implement the
substantive law appropriately. Thus, the loss of valid claims is an important
consideration in structuring the limitation system as a whole. As a theoretical matter,
however, the contention that the plaintiff possesses a valid claim, and will be denied
a remedy if the claim is time-barred, should be irrelevant in deciding an individual
case.244 If too many claims are being barred, perhaps the entire system should be
changed or scrapped. But placing a thumb on the scales of justice in particular cases
241. See, e.g., California Say. & Loan Soc'y, 127 Cal. at 110, 59 P. at 293 ("Statutes of limitation... are not
intended as defenses to just demands of comparatively recent origin."); accord Los Angeles County v. Security First
Nat'l Bank, 84 Cal. App. 2d 575, 580, 191 P.2d 78, 82 (1948).
242. See Jack B. Weinstein & Karen S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Problems of Judges in Dealing
with Class Actions, 163 F.R.D. 369, 382 (1995) (stating that requiring the court to ignore the merits may be futile
because it may be based on "an unrealistic conception of the judge's role-and his or her mental processes-in the
prosecution and resolution of litigation. Even when a decision on the ultimate merits of the case is not imminent,
the trier is continually estimating the strength of the case.").
243. Not only do we regret the loss of meritorious claims more than we regret the loss of unmeritorious
claims, but we also regret the loss of some types of claims more than others. The more significant the right, the
more severe the injury, or the more egregious the wrong, the more reluctant courts are to bar a claim.
244. See Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 751-52, 602 P.2d 393, 395, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979)
("Thus the purpose served by dismissal on limitations grounds is in no way dependent on nor reflective of the
merits-or lack thereof-in the underlying action.") (citation omitted).
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seems underhanded, as well as unfair to other plaintiffs with meritorious claims who
fail to receive such dispensation.245
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion of the policies favoring and disfavoring limitation of
actions displays the central problem of any limitation system. To put it simply, how
should society's interest in an orderly legal system that resolves claims promptly be
balanced against its interests in compensation, retribution and deterrence? Neither the
legislature nor the judiciary has answered that question clearly.
The courts are ambivalent about limitation of actions. Sometimes courts say that
"[t]he policy behind the statute of limitations is equally as meritorious a con-
sideration as is the policy of trying cases upon their merits." 246 On the other hand,
courts sometimes say that the statute of limitations is a "disfavored" defense that
must give way to the policy favoring a hearing on the merits 47
The legislature also appears ambivalent about limitation of actions. What other
explanation could there be for the legislative tolerance of pervasive judicial bending
and shaping of the supposedly strict and fixed legislative limitation rules? This
latitude, which is most evident in such areas as accrual248 and tolling,249 suggests a
245. But see generally Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules.
84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975) (arguing that the manipulation of procedural rules to achieve results that are consistent
with the substantive law is desirable and should be encouraged).
246. Scherer v. Mark, 64 Cal. App. 3d 834, 844, 135 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1976); see Krusesky v. Baugh, 138
Cal. App. 3d 562, 566, 188 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1988) ("The policy behind statutes of limitations is as meritorious
as the policy of trying cases on their merits.") (citing Braham v. Sorenson, 119 Cal. App. 3d 367, 373, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 39,42 (1981)).
247. See, e.g., Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 152,702 P.2d 563,566,216 Cal. Rptr. 405,
408 (1985) ("Because of this strong public policy [that claims should be resolved on substantive rather than
procedural grounds] the statute of limitations is said to be a disfavored defense, to be strictly construed so as to
avoid a forfeiture of rights.") (quoting 2 B.E. WrrKiN. CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions § 227, at 1085 (2d cd.
1971)); Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399,410, 154 P.2d 399,405 (1944) ("Mhis court... has
shown itself ready to adapt rules of procedure to serve the ends of justice where technical forfeitures would
unjustifiably prevent a trial on the merits.").
248. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 192,491 P.2d 421,431, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 847 (1971).
Problems of the commencement, running, and tolling of limitation periods come frequently and
regularly to the appellate courts, and the judiciary develops a kind of expertise in this area. On the other
hand, many legislators are not attorneys, and even those who are, do not encourt problems of limitations
and accruals of actions in their daily legislative duties. Legislative silence in the present case may
indicate that the Legislature has chose to defer to judicial expertise and to repose with the judiciary the
rendition of rules for the accrual of causes of action.
Id.
249. See Bollinger, 25 Cal. 2d at 410, 154 P.2d at 405 ("In any event this court is not powerless to formulate
rules of procedure where justice demands it."); id. at 409, 154 P.2d at 405 ("Even the English statute had to be
supplemented by judicial construction and applied beyond its literal language to accomplish its purpose.").
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legislative preference that some other branch of government wrestle with the difficult
problems inherent in applying limitation of actions in particular cases ?s °
Scholarly commentators share this ambivalence. Perhaps nowhere is this as
evident as in the work of the 19th century limitation scholar Horace G. Wood. After
extolling the virtues of statutes of limitations at length, Wood makes about as hedged
a statement regarding them as could be imagined:
[L]aws of limitation are to be encouraged; yet, as they are acts which take
away existing rights, they should always be construed with reasonable
strictness, and in favor of the rights sought to be defeated thereby, so far as
is consistent with their letter and spirit.?
There are several reasons for this ambivalence. First, the disparate policies on
which limitation of actions is based sometimes point in different directions. Pro-
moting repose might require that a claim be barred, but avoiding deterioration of
evidence might not. Further, as we have seen, even a single policy as apparently
straightforward as avoiding deterioration of evidence can turn out, upon close
examination, to be more complicated when applied to particular cases.5
2
Second, each type of claim created by the substantive law arises in a different
context and possesses different characteristics. Consequently, a particular policy,
such as promoting repose or avoiding deterioration of evidence, may weigh more
heavily with respect to one type of claim than with respect to others. As one com-
mentator has explained, "the statute [of limitations] itself is not a single piece of
legislation dealing with a single thing.''as3 In some areas of the law, the "one size fits
all" approach of statutes of limitations works smoothly, but that is not always true.
Third, statutes of limitation "are by definition arbitrary."' Arbitrariness makes
us uncomfortable. z5 Among other things, the digital, on or off quality of limitation
of actions contrasts sharply with the analog, gradual nature of the evils it seeks to
prevent. Evidence does not deteriorate overnight, and society's interest in promoting
repose is only marginally greater on day two than it was on day one. The theory of
the limitation system is that we may eschew attempting to measure the relevant
phenomena directly, and that instead we may use an indirect (and rather crude)
bright-line measure of the phenomena-namely, the passage of time-as a proxy or
250. On the other hand, legislative deference to the judiciary also possesses salutary aspects. It permits the
courts some desirable flexibility to mitigate the hardship that would result from the overly strict application of
statutes of limitations in special cases. It also allows courts to employ their expertise in formulating rules of
procedural character.
251. See I WOOD, supra note 17, at 10.
252. See supra notes 77-112 and accompanying text.
253. Callahan, supra note 4, at 132.
254. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314 (1945).
255. See FLETCHER, supra note 82, at 31 ("Arbitrariness in the definition of the laws violates our essential
expectations in living under the rule of law.").
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rule of thumb. This is sometimes a sensible approach, 2 6 but the severity of the
consequences flowing from the seemingly arbitrary rule makes its arbitrariness all
the more troubling.
Fourth, like other long-term benefits, the advantages of a limitation system are
remote and difficult to quantify. By contrast, the short-term consequences of denying
compensation to an injured plaintiff are immediate and disturbing. Not surprisingly,
therefore, there is a tendency to discount the long-term benefits and to focus attention
on ameliorating the unpleasant short-term consequences. In this respect, limitation
of actions poses one of the general problems underlying our entire legal system, that
is, the trade-off between orderly procedure and desirable outcomes in particular
cases. Some have argued that courts should strongly resist the pressure to focus on
individual outcomes. As one scholar has explained, "[s]ometimes the preoccupation
with the merits of individual cases obscures the need to insist that procedural rules
apply even if they may frustrate a full airing of the merits of an individual case be-
cause they promote system-wide improvements in accuracy. '" 7 Others have argued
precisely the opposite.258 The opposing argument, however, is problematic: taken to
their logical extreme, the policies disfavoring limitation of actions weigh not only
against applying limitation rules to bar particular claims, but also against having a
limitation system at all. Indeed, they weigh against enforcing any procedural rule that
would have the effect of impairing a party's prospects for success on the merits.
Fifth, the limitations system implicates unresolved and perhaps unresolvable
tensions that pervade the legal system. How do we weigh the relative values of com-
pensating the wronged and exonerating the innocent? How should we balance
individual interests against the welfare of society as a whole? The answers to such
questions are as elusive in this context as in any other.
Is a limitation system worth having? On balance, we think that it is; and the
continued existence of statutes of limitation in "all enlightened systems of juris-
256. Sometimes general rules are preferable, even though they are imperfect and result in unfortunate
outcomes in a subset of cases, at least as long as the subset of cases is not too large, and the consequences for those
affected are not too severe. See David P. Currie, ResJudicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L.REV. 317,350
(1978) (stating that "the cost and uncertainty of making case-by-case inquiries into competing considerations may
justify categorical exceptions that are in some respects overinclusive").
257. Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PnIT. L. REv. 725,755 (1989); see Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487
U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The principle that 'mere technicalities' should not stand in the way
of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to their
construction and application."); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes: A Plea for
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 39 (1974) (asking attorneys to "[c]onsider how often laymen seem ready
to dismiss procedural rules as 'mere technicalities' even though these are the very rules which must secure most
process values").
258. See Clark, supra note 212, at 297 ("[The court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which
are after all intended only as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the
particular case .... ") (quoting In re Coles, 1 K.B. 1, 4 (1907)).
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prudence ''259 suggests a widely shared belief that limitation of actions still has an
important role to play in the orderly functioning of society. Some type of time limit
makes sense. It is still true, as John Marshall recognized nearly two centuries ago,
that a claim that could be "brought at any distance of time.., would be utterly
repugnant to the genius of our laws."
If we are to realize the benefits of a limitation system, however, we must be
willing to accept the fact that some valid claims will be barred, and that some claims,
whether valid or invalid, will not receive the catharsis of a hearing on the merits. As
one court has explained:
The application of the statute of limitations combined with the inexorable
passage of one year results in a summary judgment preventing assertion of
what may well have been a meritorious claim. This consequence, however,
similar to that which frequently follows imposition of any rule possessing
a fixed duration, is the price of the orderly and timely processing oflitigation.6 t
If we are unwilling to accept that price, we should reconsider whether we want to
have a limitation system at all. If our overriding concern is adjudicating claims on
their merits, or vindicating valid claims, then perhaps we should drastically alter or
even abandon our limitation system. Ultimately, if those purposes are allowed to
trump all countervailing considerations, then the law of limitation of actions will be
incoherent and incapable of implementing the purposes justifying its existence.
Favoring those policies over the policies underlying limitation of actions across the
board deprives the limitation system of any useful purpose.
If, on the other hand, we decide to preserve our existing system of limitation of
actions, even in a modified form, then it should operate on a principled, rather than
an ad hoc, basis. The number of statutes should be reduced, general principles of
limitation ought to be stated more clearly, and the rules should be applied with
consistency. Certainly the applicable limitations rule ought not to be brushed aside
on the ground that limitations is a "disfavored" defense.262 Otherwise, we might as
well admit that a more individualized system, such as laches, would suit us better.
259. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of
society.... They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence").
260. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336,342 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 799
(West Supp. 1997) (establishing that criminal prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time).
261. Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 103, 553 P.2d 1129, 1136, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664
(1976); see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court (Lane), 233 Cal. App. 2d 333, 340,43 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480
(1965) ("[S]uch statutes [of limitation] are intended to set controversies at rest by foreclosing consideration there-
after as to the merits of the claim. To reject a strict application of the law in favor of 'broad principles ofjustice and
equity' would make a statute of limitations meaningless.").
262. Cf. Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231,236 (1887) ("The statute of limitations is entitled to the same
respect with other statutes, and ought not to be explained away.") (quoting Clementson v. Williams, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 72, 74 (1814)).
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In either case, it is clear that the law of limitation is ripe for legislative re-
examination. The current patchwork of overlapping classifications and innumerable
exceptions provides only the illusion of repose and may cost society more in terms
of time, money and judicial resources, not to mention frustration and the appearance
of unequal treatment, than is justified by the intangible benefits that it actually
manages to provide. 263 While we believe the goals of the limitation system are
worthy, the benefits that it seeks to foster can only be achieved by a system of rules
that operates with greater certainty, and with fewer transaction costs, than our present
system.
It is probably futile to attempt to isolate a single purpose from among those listed
that sensibly could be assigned a greater general importance than all of the others.264
Statutes of limitations promote a variety of overlapping and inconsistent policies.
This may be because of the disparate legal contexts in which they operate, or it may
be because, like postmodern architecture, our legal system has evolved into a com-
plex juxtaposition of seemingly incompatible theories,265 and the limitation system
merely reflects and contributes to that diversity. By describing the variety of pur-
poses served by limitation of actions, we hope to encourage legislators, courts, and
scholars to reconsider how well those purposes are being served, and to strike a
balance between competing policies that will better serve our legal system. How that
balance is struck will have significant allocative consequences, not just between
victims and wrongdoers but for society as a whole.2  While suggestions for com-
prehensive reform are beyond the scope of this Article, any such effort should be
undertaken in light of the policies that the limitation system attempts to serve.
As Justice Robert H. Jackson once observed, "[s]tatutes of limitations always
have vexed the philosophical mind."267 Because of their nature and the conflicting
policies they attempt to balance, we see no reason to predict that they will soon cease
to do so.
263. For example, it has been noted that mistakes regarding statutes of limitation are a leading cause of legal
malpractice claims. See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN &JEFFREY M. SMiTH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 29.14, at 677 (4th ed.
1996) ("The most common error of the attorney engaged in litigation is the failure to file the client's claim or cause
of action within the time required by a statute of limitations."); id. § 22.3, at 5 (noting that "[t]he most frequently
alleged error in a legal malpractice action is the failure of the attorney to comply with a time limitation").
264. But see Callahan, supra note 4, at 137 (arguing that "the protection of the social interest in individual
stability is the purpose which most nearly accords with the apparent scope of the statutes").
265. See FLETCHER, supra note 82, at 188-89 (observing "that modern legal cultures are torn in conflicting
directions by irreconcilable premises"); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
642 (1993) ("As the century draws toward its close, jurisprudence is fragmented as never before in our history.").
266. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 61, § 6.6, at 310 ("[P]roviding speedy and efficient justice works to the
greater benefit of some sectors of society than to others. If civil justice were dramatically improved in its
expeditiousness, some political interests would suffer.").
267. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,313 (1945).
